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ARTICLES
HUNTING THE DRAGON:
REFORMING THE MASSACHUSETTS MURDER STATUTE
SEAN J. KEALY*
"Other sinnes onely speake; Murther shreikes out: The Element of water moistens
the Earth, But blood flies upwards, and bedewes the heavens."
-John Webster'
I. INTRODUCTION
Murder is the most serious of all crimes. Given the grave consequences of
murder, both in act and in punishment, one would expect careful, clearly defined
elements of the crime. Unfortunately, this is often not the case. Some states,
including Massachusetts, have statutes that retain outdated or archaic common law
terms that are subject to constant redefinition by judges.
This article will examine how the Massachusetts murder statute has dramatically
changed in the last two decades. This metamorphosis has come at the hands of a
Supreme Judicial Court willing to freely interpret the archaic common law terms.
The recently approved Model Jury Instructions on Homicide2 codify the changes to
* J.D. Temple University School of Law, 1994. The author is Legal Counsel for the Joint
Committee on Criminal Justice for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This article is
lovingly dedicated to the memory of the author's father, George J. Kealy, who read a draft of
this article a few weeks before he passed away on March 2, 2001. For over 30 years he kept
order in the courtrooms of the Commonwealth as a Hampden County Deputy Sheriff and as
the Chief Court Officer at the Palmer District Court. He will be missed by all who knew
him. The author thanks the following people for their assistance and support in writing this
article: Stacey G. Bloom, Mark Molloy, Senator Cynthia Stone Creem and especially Susan
and Nell Kealy. The opinions within this article are Mr. Kealy's and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Criminal Justice Committee.
2 JOHN WEBSTER, The Duchess of Malfi, Act 4, Sc. 2 (1623), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN WEBSTER (F.L. Lucas ed., 1928).
2 The Model Jury Instructions were approved in Massachusetts in 1999. This article is
not intended as a definitive statement of what the law of homicide in Massachusetts currently
is, but rather how it has recently evolved through the judicial process. For a survey of the
current law including the recently approved Model Instructions on Homicide, see Patricia A.
O'Neill & Katherine E. McMahon, Recent Developments in the Law of Malice and
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the law of homicide over the last thirty years.3 However, this restatement of the
law occurred outside the legislative system and therefore, may not reflect how the
public believes murder is defined and its appropriate punishment. The murder
statute, in fact, has effectively gone untouched by the Legislature since 1858.
Second, the Model Instructions do not restrict the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC')
from continuing to redefine the substantive law through case law. Some attempts
to rectify this legislative neglect, notably a bill to add a definitional section to the
current statute sponsored by the Massachusetts District Attorney's Association
were recently offered.4 However, I propose that a better course of action is to
subject the murder statute to the legislative process and to rewrite the statute
without relying on archaic common law terms.
Part I of this article examines the common law history of murder as it developed
over the centuries. Part II analyzes how murder was ultimately codified in
Massachusetts during the 19th century. Part III discusses how various court
decisions recently altered the nature of murder, and specifically how malice is
defined. Finally, Part IV proposes a new murder statute that is clearly written, not
tied to archaic common law terms and attempts to properly punish homicides
according to culpability.
II. THE COMMON LAW DEFINITION-FROM ENGLAND TO MASSACHUSETTS
"The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History
must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of
rules which it is our business to know. It is part of the rational study, because it is
the first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate
reconsideration of the worth of those rules. "
The law of homicide, the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and the
various grades of each, took centuries to develop. As this body of law developed,
the terms that define the various forms of murder such as "malice,"
"premeditation," "extreme atrocity" and "felony-murder," became terms of art and
divorced from their original meaning. These terms are often not only absolutely
indecipherable to lay people, but due to the changing nature of case law, their
meaning has become elusive for the bench and the bar alike.
In 1858, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a murder statute, but it simply
codified common law terms and principles without further defining those terms.
Given the Legislature's use of common law terms, the courts were free to develop
and to change the definitions of those terms. To understand what the Legislature
codified and how the courts changed the law of murder, one must understand how
Homicide, 84 MASS. L. REv. 158 (2000).
' See id.
4 See H.R. 3430, 182d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999).
5 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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the law of murder developed.
A. English Common Law
Early English common law did not consider a person's mental state when
establishing liability for homicide. Rather, the English adopted a form of strict
liability, thereby; a person was liable if his or her conduct in any way caused the
victim to "be nearer to death or further from life."6 A person was liable for the
homicide even in instances of an accident or self-defense.7 It was not until the 12t'
century that mens rea, literally a "guilty mind," became a consideration in
homicide cases, thus excusing a person who killed without fault from punishment.'
After this important development, homicide was divided into two categories. The
first category was justifiable and excusable homicides, which were not subject to
punishment. The second category included felonious homicides and murderous or
secret killings,9 which were both punishable by death.
All unjustified and unexcused homicides carried the death penalty. 0  In
response, the common law developed an exception to the law called "benefit of
clergy" in order to soften the harsh penalties for certain killers." The benefit of
clergy exception shielded those who qualified for its protection from capital
punishment. 2  Originally, only clergy members could benefit from clergy
6 RoY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 1-2 (1952) (citing 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52 (3d ed. 1923)).
7 See id. at 2.
8 See id. at 5-7 (emphasis added).
9 The term "murder" developed during this period to categorize certain secret killings.
The history of the term "murder" reveals the rationale behind the "lying-in-wait" form of
homicide:
After the Norman conquest of England, the enmity of the subjected Anglo-Saxons
sought satisfaction in secret slayings of Normans by waylaying. To crush this evil,
William the Conqueror imposed a heavy amercement fine called the murdrum upon any
hundred where a Norman was found by a slain by an unknown hand. Anyone killed
under such circumstances was presumed to be a Norman and to have met death at the
hands of Anglo-Saxons who had lain in wait for him. The sole rebuttal of the
presumption was the presentment of Englishry, that is, proof that the deceased was
English and not Norman. By 1340 there were practically no foreign born Normans left
in England. Therefore, the fine was abolished in that year, but the word "murder" lived
on as the worst kind of homicide, although without its former technical meaning.
Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
10 See id.
" See id. at 10.
12 Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 541-
42 (1934). Perkins states that:
[i]n ancient times the lay courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over the clergy in
felony cases. The members of the clergy could be tried only in the ecclesiastical court
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protection, but eventually it protected all who met certain criteria, such as the
ability to read. 3
The benefit of clergy exception ultimately led to the introduction of the term
"malice aforethought."' 4 From 1496 to 1547 Parliament passed a series of statutes
excluding some of the more serious felonious homicides from benefit of clergy
protection. 5 The excluded homicides were referred to as "murder committed with
malice aforethought."' 16  This new element of malice aforethought, therefore,
became the dividing line between the most serious crime of murder and other
felonious, but lesser, homicides. As with most innovations of British law during
the Elizabethan period, the definition of Lord Coke became the standard: "[m]urder
is when a [person], of sound memory and of the age of discretion, unlawfully
killeth... any reasonable creature in [being] under the king's peace, with malice
[aforethought], expressed or... implied by law....""7 English law named
homicides committed without malice aforethought manslaughter. Although such
crimes were purposeful killings, the law deemed those homicides to lack malice
aforethought because they occurred based upon "chance-medley,"' 8 such as in the
cases of a physical altercation or the discovery of a spouse in the act of adultery.'
Those killings committed with malice aforethought were treated more severely than
any other killings, and the penalties reflected the difference, murder was punishable
by death whereas manslaughter was punishable by a brand on the thumb and up to
a year's imprisonment.2"
The key to understanding what constituted murder quickly became how one
defined "malice aforethought." Prior to the 16 th century, "malice aforethought"
suggested only that a felonious homicide was not accidental and implied little about
intentional wrongdoing.2' By the 16th century, malice aforethought became
associated with the concept of a premeditated killing, as opposed to a sudden or
provoked killing. 22 Thereafter the common law presumed malice aforethought, and
the defendant bore the burden of showing the existence of a legal justification or
and could be punished only by such penalty as that court could inflict. It was an
elementary rule that the church would never pronounce a judgment of blood.
Id. (quoting I Pollock and Maitland at 424).
'" See id.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 543; see also MORELAND, supra note 6, at 9.
16 Perkins, supra note 12, at 543.
17 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 47 (E & R Brooke 1794).
18 In the context of homicide, "chance-medley" is sometimes defined as any kind of
homicide by misadventure, but is more often strictly applicable to such killing only as
happens in defending one's self. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
19 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 191-92 (Garland Pub. 1978).
20 Perkins, supra note 12, at 544.
21 See id. at 545; MORELAND, supra note 6, at 10.




The common law did not limit malice aforethought to hatred, ill-will, or the
desire of revenge against the victim, but included several other possible situations.
"The malice requisite to murder or other culpable homicide may be that of the
disposition or temper, independently of a definite motive to, or end proposed to be
attained by a homicide. 24 Several common law examples included, cruelty or a
depraved spirit,2" facilitating the commission of a crime,26 and situations of reckless
behavior or gross negligence.27
Although premeditation was useful in proving malice aforethought, the law did
not always require proof of planning activity. If no motive was obvious, and the
killing was not in response to provocation, the law assumed that the killer had a
concealed motive.28 This assumption led to the development of the concepts of
"express" and "implied" malice. 29
Where planning and motive were apparent, the law expressly acknowledged
malice aforethought." A judge could also find malice aforethought without
external evidence, such as a clear motive, under the theory of implied malice.3
Implied malice was an inference of fact, one that assumes that people generally
intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts.32 By the 19"h century, it
22 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *201; 1 EDWARD H. EAST, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 224 (P.R. Glasebrook ed., Professional Books 1972)(1803).
24 1 HALE 475; 1 EAST, P.C. 224 (1803).
25 For example, Ross's C. I GAL. 628; FOST. 256; Or by resolving to kill the next man
one shall meet. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *200.
26 In a homicide done incidentally to the commission of any other intended crime, or in
the doing of another intended act, the malice and its kind and degree is indicated by the
crime intended, or by the motive, manner, means and circumstances of the commission of
the crime or the doing of the act. FOST. 290, 291; 1 EAST, supra note 24, at 234.
27 For example, 1 HALE, 475; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *200; 1 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 29 § 12 (7th ed. 1795); 1 EAST, P.C.
231 (deliberately discharging a gun at a multitude of people); 1 HAWKINS, ch. 31 § 68 (riding
a horse, known to be vicious and dangerous, into the midst of a multitude of people); I
HALE, 475; 3 COKE, supra note 17, at 57; 1 EAST, supra note 24, at 231 (throwing a stone
likely to do bodily injury, among a crowd, though no injury is intended to any one in
particular); SQUIRE'S C. RUSSELL ON CR. 620, Ed. of 1224 (grossly and cruelly neglecting or
refusing to supply nourishment to one, whom the party so neglecting or refusing is bound to
support).
28 Perkins, supra note 12, at 546.
29 MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ON THE PENAL CODE REPORT 18 n.v (1844) (citing Russ.
ON CRIME. b.3, c.1, p. 614, Ed. 1824)).
30 3 COKE, supra note 17, at 51; 1 HAWKINS, supra note 27, at ch. 31, § 3. Express
malice, therefore, had to be proven by external evidence, "when one kills another with a
deliberate mind and formed design; such formed design being evidenced by external
circumstances discovering the inward intention. RUSSELL. ON CRIME. b.3, c.1, p. 614
(1824).
31 MORELAND, supra note 6, at 11-12.
32 See id.
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was an accepted legal doctrine that malice could be established by proof of intent to
kill or intent to inflict serious injury, or "wanton disregard" of the risk to human
life. 3 Malice aforethought could be reduced to four different states of mind:
(a.) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, any person,
whether such person is the person actually killed or not;
(b.) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause the death
of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether such person is the person
actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by
indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a
wish that it may not be caused;
(c.) An intent to commit any felony whatever;
(d.) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way to, in, or
returning from the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping in custody, or
imprisoning any person whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in
custody, or imprison, or the duty of keeping the peace or dispersing an
unlawful assembly, provided that the offender has notice that the person killed
is such an officer so employed.34
As the meaning of malice aforethought moved away from intentional or
premeditated killings, the role of provocation also changed, eventually becoming a
form of mitigation in an intentional killing. 5  As Justice Holmes wrote,
"[a]ccording to current morality, a man is not so much to blame for an act done
under the disturbance of great excitement, caused by a wrong done to himself, as
when he is calm."36 An individual is not a murderer if he kills with the proper
provocation because "[t]he law is made to govern men through their motives, and it
must, therefore, take their mental constitution into account."37
One of the most dramatic changes to the law of murder was an American
33 Perkins, supra note 12, at 552-57. Justice Holmes took the following example from
Blackstone to illustrate the difference between the level of recklessness required for murder
and conduct that is merely manslaughter:
When a workman flings down a stone or piece of timber into the street, and kills a man;
this may be either misadventure, manslaughter, or murder, according to the
circumstances under which the original act was done: if it were in a country village,
where few passengers are, and he calls out to all people to have a care, it is
misadventure only; but if it were in London, or other populous town, where people are
continually passing, it is manslaughter, though he gives loud warning; and murder, if he
knows of their passing, and gives no warning at all.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 60 (1881) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES * 192).
14 Id. at 52 (quoting SIR JAMES STEPHEN, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAW art. 233 (1883)).
35 MORELAND, supra note 6, at 10-11.




innovation of the late 18th and early 19'h century: the division of murder into
degrees. In 1794, the Pennsylvania Legislature created two distinct levels of
murder to drastically reduce the number of capital offenses. " The Pennsylvania
legislature declared that "[t]he several offenses, which are included under the
general denomination of murder, differ so greatly from each other in the degree of
their atrociousness that it is unjust to involve them in the same punishment."39
Therefore, the Pennsylvania legislature developed first degree murder and second
degree murder which several other states adopted over the next fifty years.40
American law wanted the slowly evolving concepts of culpability to reflect the
"current morality" of society. Still, the changes were viewed in terms of decades
and centuries. During the early and mid 19d' century some American states sought
to end or limit the common law evolution of murder through codification. Other
states, such as Massachusetts, chose to enshrine common law terms and concepts
within their new murder statutes.
B. Murder in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Bay Colony Charter expressly required that the new colony
not enact any laws contrary to the laws of England. The colonists broadly
interpreted this provision to mean simply that their laws could not contradict the
basic principles found in English law and its unwritten Constitution.42 When the
colonists developed their laws, they started with English common law and statutes
and tempered them with principles of natural law and their own Puritan Protestant
beliefs.4 3 The 1641 Body of Liberties includes the first Massachusetts murder
statute. That statute, which cited Biblical authority for each provision, mandated
death for nearly every unjustified homicide, whether provoked or not:
If any person committ any willful murther, which is manslaughter, committed
upon premeditated mallice, hatred, or Crueltie, not in a mans necessarie and
just defence, nor by meere casualtie against his will, he shall be put to
death.". .. If any person slayeth an other suddaienly in his anger or Crueltie of
38 Samuel Pillsbury, Evil & The Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 452 (1990).
39 Id. (quoting Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of
Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 772-73 (1949) (quoting 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 242 (1974) codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4701 (Purdon 1945))).
40 Matthew A. Pauley, Murder By Premeditation, 36 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 145, 146 (2d ed.
1986); WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 642 (2d ed. 1986).
41 See generally Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Sources And Nature Of Law In Colonial




44 MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641, Liberty 94 §4. See EDWIN POWERS,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 1620-1692: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
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passion, he shall be put to death. 5 . . .If any person shall slay another through
guile, either by poysoning or other such develish practice, he shall be put to
death.
In 1804, Massachusetts redrafted the statute to include "willful" murder, felony-
murder, and criminal solicitation.46 Although not specifically mentioned, the courts
interpreted the statute to include malice aforethought as an essential element of
murder: "[t]o constitute the crime of murder... the killing must have been with
malice, either expressed or implied ..... But though innocent of the crime of
murder, the prisoner may ... be convicted of manslaughter....
During the 19th century, legal codification became a popular concept.
Consequently, several states left behind their common law traditions and adopted
comprehensive penal codes. Like many other states, Massachusetts's lawmakers
sought to codify their common laws.4" The works of Jeremy Bentham inspired this
movement, arguing for a single legal code for judges to interpret, but not to expand
upon or alter.49 Bentham proposed that only legislative action should expand or
alter this legal code." The codification movement shared many common themes
including a distrust of the past, the belief that the legislative process should
regularly reconsider the law on the basis of modem developments, that judge made
law was undemocratic, and that codification offered greater clarity, brevity and
545 (1966). This section cites as authority Exodus 21:12-13 "Whoever strikes a man a
mortal blow must be put to death. He, however, who did not hunt a man down, but caused
his death by an act of God, may flee to a place which I will set apart for this purpose" and
Numbers 35:31, "You shall not accept indemnity in place of the life of a murderer who
deserves the death penalty; he must be put to death." quoted in POWERS, supra.
45 MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641, supra note 44, at 94 §5. This section
cites as authority Leviticus 24:17 and Numbers 35: 20-21, "If a man pushes another out of
hatred, or after lying in wait for him throws something at him, and causes his death, or if he
strikes another out of enmity and causes his death, he shall be put to death as a murderer.
The avenger of blood may execute the murderer on sight" quoted in POWERS supra note 44,
at 545.
46 See 1804 MASS. ACTSc. 123 § 1 (1809).
[T]hat if any person shall commit the Crime of Willful Murder, or shall be present,
aiding and abetting in the Commission of such Crime, or, not being present, shall have
been accessory thereto before the fact, by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the
same to be done, every such offender... shall suffer the punishment of death.
Id.
41 Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass(1 Tyung). 134, 138-40 (1809).
48 For a discussion of the codification movement during this period and especially in
California, see Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative
Abdication and Judicial Vacillation, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 313, 320-23 (1999).
49 See id. at 320 (citing Justice Scarman, Codification and Judge-Made Law: A Problem




simplicity making the law more accessible to the individual." Only a few
jurisdictions, however, adopted codes with all of these lofty goals in mind. Many
more jurisdictions emphasized the more modest goals of systemizing and
simplifying the law, along the same lines of as Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's
proposed 1878 Criminal Code in England. 2 For example, Stephen's proposed code
excluded the term "malice aforethought" from the law of murder, because the term
was too complex, ill defined and incompatible with the goal of simplifying the law.
" The codification movement took hold in the United States including New York
in 1865 and California in 1872, who both attempted to redraft their penal codes.5 4
Although Bentham's goals were conspicuously absent from these codes, the New
York code did not include common law terms, such as malice aforethought, to
prevent courts from relying on common law precedent to intelligibly decipher their
meaning.55
In 1833, the Massachusetts Legislature created the Commission on the
Penal Code to study common law crimes and to report findings on how to best
reduce the common law to a statutory scheme. 6 In 1844, the Commission issued a
report that included a chapter on the law of homicide.57 In addition to proposing a
statute built upon a foundation of common law terms, the Commission
recommended that murder be split into two levels, first-degree and second-degree
murder. 8 The division of murder into two distinct categories was an attempt to
make the punishment proportionate to the severity of criminal activity.59 First-
degree murder included only the homicides the Commission believed to be the
most blameworthy: malicious killings committed with deliberate premeditation,
killings committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, and killings committed during
the commission of felonies that carried at least a penalty of life imprisonment.
Death was the punishment for "first-degree" murders.6' Life imprisonment was the
punishment for all other murders.61 This sentencing scheme broke away from the
common law tradition that included within the defimition of capital murder many
cases of unintentional killing, and a great variety of offenses terminating
accidentally in death.62
51 See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifers of the Common Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78
COLUtM. L. REV. 1098, 1099-06 (1978).
52 See id. at 1121.
3 See id. at 1129.
14 See id. at 1137.
" See id. at 1136.
56 1832 Mass. Acts ch. 30.
57 MASS. COMM. ON PENAL CODE REPORT § 4 n.(c) (1844).




62 See id. The Commission cites the example of English law that if "one engaged in the
perpetration of any 'felony' (a word of wide and somewhat doubtful interpretation in the
common law) shall kill another, though accidentally, and where the offender could not have
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The movement to update the Massachusetts murder statute continued in 1846
when Governor George N. Briggs called for reform during his annual address to the
Legislature.6 3 Governor Briggs stated that the mandatory death penalty in murder
cases was often too severe.' First, he argued, prosecutors found it difficult to
obtain convictions because some juries resisted sentencing some defendants to
death because: "too heavy a blow in their opinion will fall upon the head of a
fellow human being . . ."' This trend, in the opinion of the Governor, ultimately
weakened public confidence in the jury system. 66 Second, Governor Briggs argued
that the severe penalty led to frequent use of the pardoning power.67 The Governor
recommended that only "the willful and deliberate murderer" be punished with
death; murders "committed under circumstances of mitigation," should be punished
by life in prison.68
Despite these calls for reform, the Legislature did not amend the murder statute
until 1858. The new statute divided murder into two degrees, reserving the death
penalty for only those "serious" murders identified by the Commission69 Secondly,
and significantly, the Legislature authorized the jury to determine the degree of
murder.70 This provision seems to be a response to Governor Briggs and was
intended to keep juries from taking the law into their own hands by refusing to
convict of a capital offense. Rather than allowing the jury to choose a verdict of
murder in the second degree when the facts warranted murder in the first degree,
the new statute was intended to oblige the jury to find facts within legislative
foreseen the consequence, he is guilty of murder" Id. (citing 3 COKE INST. 56).
63 Address of His Excellency George N. Briggs to the Two Branches of the Legislature of
Massachusetts (Mass. 1846).
64 See id. at 16-17.
65 Id. at 16.
66 See id. at 16-18.
67 See id. at 17. He argued that even though an executive magistrate should not
"interpose and arrest the execution of a law, because in his opinion its penalty was too
severe," he stated that when public sentiment for leniency becomes too great, "there is
danger that the pressure it might be too powerful for a kind-hearted though upright
magistrate to resist." Id.
68 Id. at 18.
69 1858 Mass. Acts c. 154. This statute read in relevant part:
Section 1. Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or in
the commission of an attempt to commit any crime a crime punishable with
imprisonment for life, or committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is murder in the
first degree.
Section 2. Murder not appearing to be in the first degree is that in the second.





categories. 7 The current Massachusetts murder statute remains substantively the
same as the 1858 statute:
Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted
commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is
murder in the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first
degree is murder in the second degree. Petit treason shall be prosecuted and
punished as murder. The degree of murder shall be found by the jury. 2
The Legislature accepted only limited changes to the common law tradition.
First-degree murder is limited to malicious premeditated killings,73 killings that
were extremely atrocious or cruel, and felony-murders that had an underlying
penalty of death or life in prison. Although Massachusetts has not had a death
penalty case since 1972,"4 the difference in punishment between the two degrees is
significant. First degree murder carries the mandatory penalty of a life sentence in
state prison, without the possibility of parole;75 second degree murder also carries a
life sentence, but with the possibility of parole after 15 years.76
Rather than rewriting the statute to be clear and free from judicial expansion,
contraction, or alteration as Bentham proposed, the legislature continued to define
murder in common law terms. The most important, and confusing, element of
murder continues to be "malice aforethought." In Massachusetts, malice
aforethought includes anger, hatred and revenge, and any other unlawful and
unjustifiable motive.77 Malice aforethought has also been defined as intent to
71 See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 364 N.E.2d 1052, 1065 (Quirico J., concurring)
(1977).
72 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1.
13 Whereas malice refers to the mental state of the defendant, deliberate premeditation
describes the mental process by which the malice is formed. 32 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & BRUCE
R. HENRY, MASSACHUSETTS CRIrNAL LAW ch. 8, § 176 (2d ed. 1988).
74 In 1972 the United States Supreme Court found the death penalty to be cruel and
unusual punishment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Since that time, several
legislative attempts to revive capital punishment in Massachusetts were found violative of
Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See, e.g., District Attorney for the
Suffolk District v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980). Despite an amendment to the
Massachusetts Constitution to allow the death penalty, the SJC again struck down the law.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abimael Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984). In recent
years, the death penalty has not had sufficient support in the legislature for passage. See, e.g.
Erin C. McVeigh, Death Penalty Bill Soundly Defeated, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2001 at
B4. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §2.
76 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127 §133A.
77 See Commonwealth v. Mangum, 256 N.E.2d 297, 303-04 (Mass. 1970);
Commonwealth v. Leate, 225 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Mass. 1967) (citing Commonwealth v.
Webster, 5 Cush 295, 304) Commonwealth v. Lussier, 128 N.E.2d 569, 575, 592 (Mass.
1955); Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 93, 104 (1845).
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inflict injury "without legal justification or palliation. 7 1 Until the mid 1990s,
Massachusetts law established malice aforethought through proof of any one of the
following three malice prongs:
(1) The defendant (without justification or excuse) either specifically intended
to kill the victim; or
(2) specifically intended to do the victim grievous bodily harm; or
(3) intended to do an act creating a plain and strong likelihood that death or
grievous bodily harm would follow.
79
Until recently, the first and second malice prongs could both apply to either first
or second-degree murder, with the difference being the presence of premeditation.
The third malice prong, which is not compatible with premeditation because it
encompasses reckless killings, could only be applied to second-degree murder.
The continued inclusion of common law terms, such as "malice aforethought,"
"deliberately premeditated," "extreme atrocity or cruelty," along with the common
law concept of felony-murder, within the murder statute, which remain undefined
outside of case law has resulted in interpretational problems for the SJC. The
SJC's decisions of the last 20 years have significantly changed the nature of each of
these concepts. Equally important is the fact that despite these changes, the
Legislature never clarified or redrafted the law of murder to reflect current public
opinion.
III. RECENT CHANGES TO THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
"When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you
can count his teeth and claws, and seejust what is his strength. ,
A. Malice Aforethought
In a 1934 article on the subject of malice aforethought, Professor Rollin M.
Perkins stated, "[t]he phrase 'malice aforethought,' although it has been reasonably
78 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 252 N.E.2d 880, 881 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v.
Bedrosian, 142 N.E. 778, 779 (Mass. 1924). An action in self-defense, however, excludes
malice. See Connolly v. Commonwealth, 387 N.E.2d 519, 522-23 (Mass. 1979) (trial judges
are warned against use of "finding" language in connection with malice).
79 See Commonwealth v. Blake, 564 N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (Mass. 1991). The new standard,
"knowledge of a reasonably prudent person that in the circumstances known to the
defendant, the defendant's act was very likely to cause death" may be found in
Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Mass. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v.
Grey, 505 N.E.2d 171, 173 n.l (Mass. 1987)).
80 Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 5, at 469.
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stable from day to day, has shifted its moorings appreciably during the centuries,
and gives today no assurance that the period of change has passed."'" Recent
Massachusetts case law demonstrates that the law of murder, and especially the
interpretation of "malice aforethought," is not so much shifting at its moorings, but
rather adrift on the tide. In recent years, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
significantly narrowed the concept of malice. In addition, the case law greatly
changed the nature of third prong malice that effectively blurred the line
distinguishing malice in murder and manslaughter.
1. The Limitation of Second Prong Malice
For centuries, proof of either an intent to kill or an intent to commit bodily
harm to the victim proved malice aforethought. In the last five years, the SJC
severely restricted second prong malice, the intent to cause a victim bodily harm, to
the point where it no longer applies to first-degree murder and may only be used to
prove second degree murder." Amazingly, the SJC did this without stating that it
was dramatically changing the law of murder and without setting forth their reasons
for the change.
The SJC's assault on second prong malice began in 1995 with Commonwealth v.
Judge.83 The court accepted the trial judge's instructions on the traditional "three
prong" definition of malice aforethought, 4 but ultimately limited the definition of
malice when it turned its attention to the concept of "deliberate premeditation."85
The court stated that deliberate premeditation requires specific intent-that the
defendant act with the intent that his actions will cause death and that he acted with
sufficient time to reflect on that consequence.86 The court claimed to derive this
position from the definition of "deliberate premeditation" as found in cases that
went back to 1905.87 Quoting from Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, the court stated
that the word "deliberately" in the phrase "deliberately premeditated malice
aforethought" referred to a prior formation of a purpose to kill.88 The court did not
81 Perkins, supra note 12, at 570.
82 See Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 1995).
83 See id.
84 Id. at 437 (citing Commonwealth v. Puleio, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Mass. 1985)).
85 Id.
86 See Judge, 650 N.E.2d at 1248 (citing Commonwealth v. Podlaski, 385 N.E.2d 1379,
1384 (Mass. 1979)) and Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 284 N.E.2d 216, 218 (Mass. 1972),
both of which held that to convict on a theory of deliberate premeditation a jury must find "a
conscious and fixed purpose to kill continuing for a length of time"). See Satterfield, 284
N.E.2d at 218.
87 See Judge, 650 N.E.2d at 1248 n.6; Commonwealth v. Blaikie 378 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass.
1978). "The word 'deliberately' in the expression 'deliberately premeditated malice
aforethought' has reference to the prior formation of a purpose to kill rather than to any
definite length of time." Judge, 650 N.E.2d at 1248 n.6 (quoting Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin, 224 N.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 916 (Mass. 1967)).
88 See Judge, 650 N.E.2d at 1248 n.6
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find prejudicial error and upheld the conviction. 9 Yet, the Judge decision planted
the seeds for a dramatic change in second prong malice.
Two 1998 cases have built upon Judge. In both Commonwealth v. Diaz and
Commonwealth v. Jenks, the defendants were convicted of murder in the first
degree by reason of deliberate premeditation. 90 In Diaz, the defendant argued that
the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that deliberate premeditation was
incompatible with second or third prong malice. 9' Relying on Judge, the defendant
contended that neither second nor third prong malice require a specific intent to
kill 9 and that the jury mistakenly believed it could convict the defendant on a
theory of deliberate premeditation without proof of a specific intent to kill.93
Although the court refused to overturn the conviction, it agreed that it "would have
been better to make clear to the jury... that murder in the first degree by reason of
deliberate premeditation relates only to the first prong of malice." 94
The concept of second prong malice as it relates to first-degree murder gasped its
last breath on August 3, 1999 when the SJC approved new model jury instructions
on homicide.95 The Model Instructions state the elements for murder in the first
degree by deliberate premeditation as: a) an unlawful killing with, b) malice which
equals an intent to cause death, and c) deliberate premeditation. 96 An endnote
89 See id. at 1248.
90 Commonwealth v. Diaz, 689 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (Mass. 1998), Commonwealth v.
Jenks, 689 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Mass. 1998).
91 See Diaz, 689 N.E.2d at 807.
92 See id. (citing Judge, 650 N.E.2d at 1248).
9' See id.
94 Id. Likewise, in Jenks, the court held that although the judge instructed the jury on all
three prongs of malice, the instructions were clear and in accord with previous case law.
Additionally the court found that the deliberate premeditation requirement for first-degree
murder requires a specific intent to kill. See Jenks, 689 N.E.2d at 822 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 675 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Mass. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 123
(1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Waitte, 665 N.E.2d 982, 991 (Mass. 1996))).
95 The Committee on Model Jury Instructions on Homicide proposed the Model
Instructions. the Supreme Judicial Council appointed the committee and charged it with
recommending a reasonably simplified set of jury instructions on the law of homicide and
related issues. The Committee, chaired by Supreme Judicial Court Justice John M. Greaney,
included representatives from the judiciary, prosecutors, and the defense bar. An initial set
of draft Model Jury Instructions was published for comment and responses and commentary
were solicited from the legal community. The Supreme Judicial Court issued a statement
with the Model Instructions which cautioned that the instructions are not intended to be a
comprehensive statement of the law on homicide but are designed to provide guidance on
instructions that are frequently given in trials of homicide cases. The court stated, however,
that trial judges should use the model instructions in applicable cases unless they determine
that a different instruction would more clearly or accurately state the law. Supreme Judicial
Court Public Information Office Press Release (Aug. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
96 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide, Supreme Judicial Court Public Information
Office Press Release (Aug. 3, 1999). The model instruction for malice states: "The second
element the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the killing was
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accompanying the elements stated that the court intended to eliminate second prong
malice; "[i]t is clear from recent cases, however, that the second prong of malice,
i.e., an intent to do grievous bodily harm, is also insufficient, since deliberately
premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant formed a plan to kill after
deliberating."97
The court may claim that its recent rulings are rooted in precedent dating back to
1905, but it ignores several cases where second prong malice was valid proof of
premeditated malice aforethought. As recently as 1985, in Commonwealth v.
Puleio, the court clearly stated that the presence of either the first or second prong
of malice could prove first-degree murder. In Puleio, the defendant pulled out a
gun and shot at an acquaintance during an altercation with a third party but missed
and killed a bystander.98 The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder
on a theory of deliberate premeditation.9 The defendant appealed the conviction
alleging five errors, including an objection to the judge's definition of malice
during the charge to the jury."° The trial judge instructed the jury on malice as
follows:
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant fired
the pistol, you will return a verdict of not guilty. If you are convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant fired the pistol intending to kill Wayne
Subatch, you will return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. If
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant fired the
pistol intending to injure Mr. Subatch, in such circumstances known to the
defendant that, according to common experience, there was a plain and strong
likelihood that death would follow the firing, then even though you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill
Wayne Subatch, you will return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second
degree. o'
The trial judge offered the jury three choices: not guilty, guilty of first degree
murder based upon deliberately premeditated first prong malice, or guilty of second
degree murder based upon third prong malice. The defendant argued that the judge
erred by failing to properly define for the jury the word "malice."' 2 The court
agreed that the instruction was erroneous because "[i]t was clearly incorrect to say
that, to establish murder in the first degree, the Commonwealth had to prove that
the defendant intended to kill" the other man."0 3 The court ruled that this incorrect
committed with malice. Malice, as it applies to deliberately premeditated murder, means an
intent to cause death. The Commonwealth must prove that the defendant actually intended
to cause the death of the deceased." Id. at 8.
97 Commonwealth v. Jenks, 689 N.E.2d 820; Commonwealth v. Diaz, 689 N.E.2d 804.
98 Commonwealth v. Puleio, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Mass. 1985).
99 See id. at 1079.
100 See id.
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standard placed "too heavy a burden on the Commonwealth. '"'0°
The judge's instruction erroneously deprived the Commonwealth of the ability to
satisfy the mens rea requirement for murder in the first degree by establishing, in
addition to deliberate premeditation, an intent to grievously injure [the other man]
or to act in a way that would create a plain and strong likelihood of his death or
grievous bodily harm. 1"5
Despite the fact that the trial judge was in error, the court upheld the conviction
in part because the jury convicted the defendant despite the fact that they were
given a very limited definition of first-degree malice."° Likewise, Commonwealth
v. Campbell and Commonwealth v. Puleio upheld this expansive version of malice
to include the first and second prong of malice to satisfy mens rea for first degree
murder. "7 The court held that malice aforethought "encompasses the intent to
inflict great bodily harm and the intent to kill."'0'
In Judge, Diaz and the Model Instructions, the SJC greatly limited the mens rea
required for first-degree murder, without even acknowledging the limitation with
clear precedents such as Puleio and Campbell. Rather than explaining the
limitation of an acceptable mens rea for first degree murder or distinguishing later
cases from the facts of Puleio, the court simply acts as though Puleio and Campbell
never existed. Worse yet, the court takes the intellectually dishonest course of
deciding Judge, Diaz and Jenks as if this limited form of mens rea was the accepted
rule since 1905. This sudden change by the court severely limited prosecutors as to
whom they were able to prosecute under a theory of first-degree murder. Some
defendants, who prior to 1995 the jury may have convicted for first-degree murder,
are now only eligible for conviction for second-degree murder. Furthermore, the
court usurped legislative authority in determining what constitutes criminal
behavior and to determine how to punish that behavior. In addition, the court
usurped the jury's power to determine the degree of murder by limiting them in
'04 Puleio, 474 N.E.2d at 1082.
105 See id. (emphasis added).
106 See id. "The defendant cannot legitimately complain of an error that only could have
benefited him." Id.
107 Puleio 474 N.E.2d at 1083; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 393 N.E.2d 820 (Mass.
1979). In Campbell, a prisoner was convicted of first degree murder for the brutal murder of
a fellow inmate. Id. at 820.
'08 Campbell, at 825 (citing Commonwealth v. Hebert, 368 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (Mass.
1977)); Commonwealth v. Mangum, 256 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Mass. 1970); ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 30-40 (1957). The court stated,
Applying these definitions, it is apparent that there was a case for the jury on the issue of
murder in the first degree. The evidence tended to show that Perrotta died of
strangulation following brutal dismemberment. The jury could infer that the wounds
were not self-inflicted; that they were inflicted intentionally, with at least the purpose of
causing grievous bodily harm to Perrotta; and that the use of two ligatures implied that
the killing had been deliberately premeditated.
Campbell, 393 N.E.2d at 826 (emphasis added).
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some cases to only a second-degree conviction.
2. The Limitation of Third Prong Malice
In recent years, the SJC also considerably limited third prong malice, . As with
second prong malice, the phrase at issue is "grievous bodily harm". Contrary to
traditional definitions of third prong malice, the court recently held that acts
creating a plain and strong likelihood of grievous bodily injury should be viewed as
involuntary manslaughter rather than murder.' °9 The court arrived at this rule over
the course of several, and seemingly inconsistent, decisions between 1987 and
1998. Additionally, in recent years, the SJC significantly changed the standard of
knowledge required for third prong malice.
a. Standard of Harm
As noted above, the rule for third prong malice traditionally applied when the
defendant intended to commit an act that created a plain and strong likelihood of
either death or grievous bodily harm. Blackstone and Holmes illustrated the third
prong malice with the workman who kills a man by flinging a stone onto a busy
street without warning, knowing that people are passing below. 10 Third prong
malice may encompass several forms of highly reckless behavior, such as certain
physical assaults made upon a child, or the burning of a dwelling house."'
Furthermore, the court held that malice is "implied from any deliberate or cruel act
against another .... " 112
Because the third prong of malice relies on what amounts to reckless behavior,
some have argued that third prong malice crimes are involuntary manslaughter and
109 Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1998).
10 See HOLMES, supra note 33, at 60 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES
"192).
"11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mello, 699 N.E.2d 1106 (Mass. 1995) (defendant fire
bombed a six-family apartment building, which he knew was occupied, in the middle of the
night); Commonwealth v. Starling, 416 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1981) (simple blow to a young
child is sufficient to permit an inference of malice).
112 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 252 N.E.2d 880, 881 (Mass. 1969) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Leate, 225 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Mass. 1967) ("Malice includes 'every... unlawful and
unjustifiable motive' and is 'implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another,
however sudden"). In Hicks, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder for
kicking the victim in the stomach several times thereby tearing the bowel attachment and
causing intemal bleeding. On appeal, the defendant argued that that the judge should have
instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The court rejected this notion first in that,
the unlawful battery was quite "likely to endanger life." Second, as a result of the kicking,
physical injury to the deceased was intended as much as the kicking action itself, therefore,
the act could not be termed merely as a "disregard of probable harmful consequences." The
fact that the defendant threw the victim to the ground and kicked him in the stomach with
such force as to cause death by internal bleeding "amply warranted a finding of malice." See
id. at 880-82.
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not murder." 3 Traditionally the court rejected such arguments." 4 Starting in the
late 1980's, however, the SJC significantly shifted its position on third prong
malice to a point where some deliberate and cruel acts are now classified as
involuntary manslaughter. Two child abuse cases illustrate this change." 5
In Commonwealth v. Starling, the defendant was baby-sitting his girlfriend's
twenty-two month old baby girl, who they later found dead due to "lacerations of
the liver", and internal bleeding "as a result of one or more 'very severe' blows to
the chest or abdomen with a blunt instrument such as a fist, a foot, or a board.""' 6
The defendant claimed that the baby fell out of bed twice, but the medical evidence
did not support his account." 7 The defendant objected to the jury instruction on
malice that stated an intentional act is "malicious" if one uses "force on the body of
another that 'will probably do grievous bodily harm to that other and will create a
strong and plain likelihood that the other will die as a result.""'" In approving that
jury instruction, the court held, "[m]alice aforethought simply does not require any
actual intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, or any foresight of such
consequences, if the jury thought them obvious in the circumstances known to the
defendant. ... We are not inclined to revise our settled doctrine." 9The Court
pointed out that the jury must make the inference from common experience. 2 '
Therefore, "a simple blow with the hand administered to a healthy adult' will not
support a finding of malice aforethought, since there is no 'plain and strong
likelihood that death will follow."" 2 But in a case of an assault and battery on a
tender infant, 'a slight blow on the head of a new-born infant, which, if inflicted on
an adult, would be harmless, but which necessarily would endanger the life and
actually caused the death of the child, is proof upon which a jury might well find a
party guilty of murder." 22  This "settled doctrine," however, would soon be
".. See id. at 882. The defendant argued that his case met the standard for involuntary
manslaughter found in Campbell:
involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused (1) in the
commission of an unlawful act, malum in se, not amounting to a felony nor likely to
endanger life..., or (2) by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable
harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 226 N.E.2d 211,218 (Mass. 1967)).
114 See id. at 882 ("unlawful battery was quite unlikely to endanger life," and hence
"could not be classified as involuntary manslaughter").
115 Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Starling, 416 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1981).
116 See Starling, 416 N.E.2d at 930.
117 See id.
"' Id. at 932.
"19 Id. at 932 (internal citations omitted).
120 Id.
121 Starling, 416 N.E.2d at 931 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660, 684
n.48 (Mass. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976)).




Starting with Commonwealth v. Grey it seems the SJC set forth a new standard
for third prong malice that requires nothing less than a plain and strong likelihood
of death:
Malice aforethought may be shown by proof that the defendant, without
justification or excuse, intended to kill the victim or to do the victim grievous
bodily harm. However, proof of such an intent is not required because malice
aforethought may be inferred if, in the circumstances known to the defendant,
a reasonably prudent person would have known that according to common
experience there was a plain and strong likelihood that death would follow the
contemplated act.1
23
Despite this clear language, the standard for third prong malice was still in
question. For example, in the 1991 decision of Commonwealth v. Sama, the court
included a plain and strong likelihood of death or injury within its standard of third
prong malice.'24 The next year, in Commonwealth v. Sires, the court returned to the
"plain and strong likelihood of death" limitation in Grey. 2 Referring specifically
to the Sama decision, Sires rejected "any suggestion that [the court has] made
something less than a plain and strong likelihood of death sufficient for the proof of
third prong malice."' 26 The waters were muddied again, however, in 1994 when
the court decided Commonwealth v. Delaney'27 and Commonwealth v. Pierce.'28
Both Delaney and Pierce reiterated Sama's third prong malice standard that
included a plain and strong likelihood of injury despite the Sires opinion.1
29
Throughout this series of cases, it seemed as if the court waited for a murder
conviction based on acts that created a plain and strong likelihood of injury, in
order to clarify the third prong malice standard.
In 1998, the SJC heard a case in which they could clearly reverse a murder
conviction based on an incorrect instruction on third prong malice. °  In
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, the defendant inflicted serious injuries on his
girlfriend's ten-month-old daughter. 3 ' The baby suffered extensive bruising to her
body, several bite marks, multiple rib fractures, a spiral fracture of the left tibia, a
lacerated and crushed liver, and internal bleeding.'32 "The medical testimony
established that the cause of death was multiple blunt force trauma that required
123 Commonwealth v. Grey, 505 N.E.2d 171, 173 n.l (Mass. 1987) (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Chance, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (Mass.
1899)).
124 See Commonwealth v. Sama, 582 N.E.2d 498,501 (Mass. 1991).
125 See Commonwealth v. Sires, 596 N.E.2d 1018, 1025 n.14 (Mass. 1992).
126 id.
127 See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 639 N.E.2d 710 (Mass. 1994).
128 See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 642 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. 1994).
129 Id. at 585; Delaney, 639 N.E.2d at 714-15.
130 See Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1998).
131 See id. at 679.
132 See id.
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four or more blows to the body."' 33 The defendant contended on appeal that the
jury instructions on the third prong of malice were confusing and incorrect because
the inclusion of the phrase "or grievous bodily harm". 3 4 The defendant argued that
this phrase improperly permitted the jurors to infer malice upon proof that the
defendant committed an act that he knew (or should have known) would result in
grievous bodily harm, 35 and that such proof is equivalent to the proof required for
manslaughter, as opposed to murder.'36 The court agreed with the defendant's
argument.'37 Relying on Sires, the court held, "[w]e reject any suggestion that we
have made something less than a plain and strong likelihood of death sufficient for
proof of the third prong of malice."' 38 Unlike previous cases, the court determined
that the Vizcarrondo fact pattern "could have 'warranted a finding of a risk of harm
less than a strong likelihood of death."" 39 The court further noted that, "[a]lthough
the injuries to the baby were severe and ultimately fatal, the injuries were not
inflicted in a manner from which malice is ineluctably inferred."'' 4' The court
contrasted this case with other examples where malice could be "ineluctably
inferred" such as stabbing a victim in the chest with a knife' and firebombing an
occupied apartment building at night.1
42
Unlike other cases that limited second prong malice, the Vizcarrondo court at
least acknowledged its prior inconsistencies. 141 The court admitted that in past cases
they included the "grievous bodily harm" language when defining third prong
malice. 44 The court explained that they included this language only in cases either
where third prong malice was not at issue, or where the jury instructions were
challenged on other grounds. 45  The court stated that, regardless of its past
decisions, "[t]hese cases are not to be read to suggest that something less than a
plain and strong likelihood of death is sufficient for proof of the third prong of
133 Id.
134 See id. at 680.
135 The judge's instructions, in relevant part, were as follows: "Malice aforethought may
be inferred if from the circumstances known to the Defendant, a reasonably prudent person
would have known that according to common experience there was a plain and strong
likelihood that death or grievous bodily harm would follow the contemplated act" Id. n.4.
136 See id. at 680.
137 See Vizcarrando, 693 N.E.2d at 680.
138 Id. at 680 (citing Commonwealth v. Sires, 688 N.E.2d 966, 971 (Mass. 1992)).
"' Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d at 681-82 (citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 426 Mass. 395,
401 (1998)). The Vizcarrondo court declared that conduct that 'involves a high degree of
likelihood that substantial harm will result to another' is the equivalent of an act where
"there [is] a plain and strong likelihood that. . .grievous bodily harm would follow."
Vizcarrando, 693 N.E.2d at 680-82.
140 Vizcarrando, 693 N.E.2d at 681.
141 See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 688 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Mass. 1998).
142 See Commonwealth v. Mello, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (Mass. 1995).
143 See Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d at 680-81 n.5.
'4 See id. at 681 n.5.
141 See id.
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malice.""'
The logic by which the SJC arrived at this conclusion, however, is troubling.
Rather than announcing a change in the common law standard and citing precedent
from other jurisdictions or announcing a public policy reason for the change, the
court simply equated two very different standards of conduct. The court declared
that the jury could not infer malice from an act where the defendant knew that
"there [is] a plain and strong likelihood that.. .grievous bodily harm would follow"
because that is the standard for manslaughter.' 47 The court was mistaken because
traditionally the standard for manslaughter is conduct that "involves a high degree
of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another."'4 It is easy to confuse
these standards because they both developed side by side through common law. If
these two distinct standards covered the same conduct, then only manslaughter or
malice would exist today, however, the two standards have strong differences and
must be distinguished in contemporary law. Not only does "plain and strong
likelihood" standard represent a higher level of probability than the "a high degree
of likelihood" standard, but a plain meaning reading of "grievous bodily injury"
indicates a higher standard of harm than "substantial harm."' 49 These cannot be
equated. 5 ' Given this legal sleight of hand, the SJC arrived at a very different
opinion in Vizcarrondo than it did in Starling, despite very similar fact patterns.
The dividing line between murder and malice has always been difficult to
determine. The court's recent decisions, however, have made it even more difficult
to predict what fact patterns will meet the malice requirements for murder. Other
146 See id.
1"1 Id. at 680.
148 NOLAN & HENRY, supra note 73, at ch. 9, § 205.
149 Justice Holmes used the following example to illustrate the differences between
murder and manslaughter:
One great difference between the two will be found to lie in the degree of danger
attaching to the act in the given state of facts. If a man strikes another with a small stick
which is not likely to kill, and which he has no reason to suppose will do more than
slight bodily harm, but which does kill the other, he commits manslaughter, not murder.
But if the blow is struck as hard as possible with an iron bar an inch thick, it is murder.
So if, at the time of striking with a switch, the party knows an additional fact, by reason
of which he foresees that death will be the consequence of a slight blow, as, for instance,
that the other has heart disease, the offence is equally murder.
HOLMES, supra note 33, at 59-60 (citations omitted).
15o The differences in standards were identified in commentary on the proposed homicide
instructions for New Mexico, "[t~he instructions should explicitly state that a critical
difference between murder in the second degree and involuntary manslaughter hinges on the
degree of risk and that a 'strong probability' rather than a mere possibility is required for
murder." Leo M. Romero, Unintentional Homicides Caused By Risk-Creating Conduct:
Problems In Distinguishing Between Depraved Mind Murder, Second Degree Murder,
Involuntary Manslaughter, And Noncriminal Homicide In New Mexico, 20 N.M. L. REv. 55,
72(1990).
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areas also blurred the line between manslaughter and murder for example with
respect to what level of knowledge the defendant must have of his act and
circumstances.
b. Knowledge
Another third prong issue is whether and how the jury considers the defendant's
knowledge of his actions and the implications of those actions at the time of the
crime.' l  Whereas a defendant's diminished mental capacity, from either
intoxication or mental illness, traditionally only affected a defendant's ability to
premeditate the crime, since 1987 the SJC applied knowledge to malice as well. In
1987, Commonwealth v. Grey extended the relevancy of mental impairment to the
defendant's ability to act with malice.'52 In 1991, the court extended this rule to
third prong malice in Commonwealth v. Sama,'53 and required the prosecution to
prove guilty knowledge when proceeding under a third prong malice theory.
54
This dramatic change in the burden of proof, where mental impairment becomes a
major evidentiary factor in a jury's decision as to whether a killing constitutes
murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or manslaughter, has been
called a "new focus in Massachusetts jurisprudence."' 55
Traditionally, the court did not restrict malice by proof of actual or specific
intent.'56 As stated in Commonwealth v. Chance, "reduced to its lowest terms,
malice in murder means knowledge of such circumstances that according to
common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death will follow the
contemplated act, coupled perhaps with an implied negation of any excuse or
justification."' 57  Third prong malice relied, therefore, on a classic "objective
standard," what a reasonably prudent person, in the circumstances known to the
defendant, would have comprehended and foresaw as the probable outcome of his
151 The question of a defendant's knowledge is exclusively within the province of the
jury, and they are "free to draw an inference of guilty knowledge .... 'if the inferences
drawn from the circumstances be reasonable and possible."' Commonwealth v. Albano, 365
N.E.2d 808, 810 (1977) (quoting Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 236 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1968),
cert. denied sub nom. Bernier v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 1058 (1969)).
148 Commonwealth v. Sama, 582 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. 1991).
152 Commonwealth v. Grey, 505 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Mass. 1987).
113 See Sama, 582 N.E.2d at 501.
154 See id.
155 Katherine E. McMahon, Murder, Malice and Mental State: A Review Of Recent
Precedent Recognizing Diminished Capacity, from Commonwealth v. Grey To
Commonwealth v. Sama, 78 MASS. L. REv. 40, 48 (1993) (providing an excellent review of
the case law leading to a diminished capacity rule as it applies to malice).
156 See Commonwealth v. Henson, 476 N.E.2d 947, 953 n.4 (Mass. 1985) (citing
PERKINS, supra note 108, at 763; See also Commonwealth v. Huot, 403 N.E2d 411, 415
(Mass. 1899); Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 380 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1978).
17 Commonwealth v. Chance, 54 N.E. 551, 554-55 (Mass. 1899), quoted in
Commonwealth v. Mangum, 256 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Mass. 1970).
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actions. ' The "subjective" standard of what the defendant actually foresaw or
intended as the outcome of his contemplated action was immaterial.'59 A subjective
standard makes available the defense of diminished capacity. The court had
created a diminished capacity rule for cases of extreme atrocity or cruelty, 6 ° and
for the first two prongs of malice, 6 ' but it had not introduced such a rule for the
general intent third prong of malice.
In 1991, the SJC introduced a subjective standard into third prong malice. In
Sama, "[t]he defendant presented credible evidence of debilitating intoxication
bearing on his ability to possess meaningful knowledge of the circumstances at the
time of the victim's death."' 62 The trial judge, however, refused to instruct the jury
that, with respect to the third prong of malice, the jurors also could consider the
effect of the defendant's mental state on the question of "what he 'knew."163 On
appeal, the court held that the jury should have been allowed to consider the
defendant's capacity when deciding whether the Commonwealth proved the
defendant's guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.'64 Under this new rule,
the jury should consider both a subjective and objective standard: "1) the nature
and extent of the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances at the time he acted;
2) whether, in the circumstances known by the defendant, a reasonably prudent
person would have recognized that the defendant's conduct would create a plain
and strong likelihood of death or injury."' 65 "[T]o establish the third prong of
malice.... the Commonwealth had [to demonstrate] that the defendant knew that he
was stabbing the victim.., and that a reasonably prudent person, although not
necessarily the defendant, would recognize that such conduct carried with it the risk
of death or serious bodily injury."'" Furthermore, the court held that evidence of a
defendant's intoxication is a factor for the jury to consider whenever the
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing the defendant's knowledge beyond
158 See Commonwealth v. Starling, 416 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Mass. 1981).
"9 See McGuirk, 380 N.E.2d at 667; Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178
(1884).
160 See Commonwealth v. Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Mass. 1980).
161 See Grey, 505 N.E.2d at 173-74.
162 Sama, 582 N.E.2d at 502.
The defendant testified that he long has suffered from uncontrolled alcoholism that in
the past had caused him to experience memory loss. Moreover, the defendant's father
testified and described his son's chronic substance abuse and what he perceived to be his
son's resulting mental impairment. Lastly, an expert witness testified on behalf of the
defendant, and she opined that the defendant could have hallucinated at the time of the
killing, due to the effect of the alcohol and drugs he ingested earlier that day.
Id.
163 Id. at 500.
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a reasonable doubt. 167
Thus, Sama extended the diminished capacity rule to the general intent third
prong of malice.1 6 ' According to the court, Sama constituted a "logical extension"
of precedent allowing a jury to consider a defendant's mental state when deciding
his intent or knowledge. 1
69
At least one commentator has stated that this introduction of subjective standards
for determining the presence of malice, is nothing less than
"revolutionary."170Jurors may now consider mental impairment in assessing
whether a defendant charged with murder acted with malice. 17' The defendant's
subjective mental condition, and not merely an assessment of his conduct under the
objective reasonable person standard, weighs in the determination of the degree of
guilt and of ultimate criminal culpability. 72 Once again, however, the court
introduced a new and radical departure from its precedent. The prosecutor's
burden became much greater as a result of this change. Significantly, this change
was made without notice and without the input of prosecutors, private attorneys and
the public that are part of the legislative process. Additionally, the question of
knowledge may be more important to forms of malice that require specific intent
rather than the general intent based third prong malice.
3. Implications of the New Definition of Malice
Although malice aforethought existed as a complicated term of art for
centuries, its definition was relatively stable over the years. The recent changes by
the SJC, however, significantly changed the nature and scope of the definition of
malice aforethought. What was always first-degree murder may now be second
degree murder, and what was second-degree murder may now be involuntary
167 See Commonwealth v. Mello, 649 N.E.2d 1106, 1116-17 (Mass. 1995); Sama, 582
N.E.2d at 501.
In order to establish the third prong of malice, the Commonwealth had the burden of
demonstrating that the defendant knew that he was setting fire to an occupied apartment
building, and that a reasonably prudent person, although not necessarily the defendant,
would recognize that such conduct carried with it the risk of death.
Mello, 649 N.E.2d at 1116.
168 See McMahon, supra note 155, at 47.
169 Commonwealth v. Sires, 596 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Mass. 1992).
170 See McMahon, supra note 155, at 48.
171 See id.
172 See id. McMahon illustrates that the use of presumptions to establish malice may
have been significantly undermined by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which found a violation of Constitutional due
process in grounding a mental element of a crime in a presumption that a man intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. McMahon suggests that the Court started to re-
think how murder could Constitutionally be proven due to this case. See id.
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manslaughter. These changes are not only confusing, but they usurp the
Legislature's prerogative to state what the law is and to formulate public policy.
Ultimately, these changes constitute bad public policy.
a. Shifting standard is confusing
The changing nature of malice is confusing to both the bench and bar. Avellar v.
DuBois is just one example of this unfortunate situation. 173 In Avellar, the jury
convicted the defendant of murder on a theory of third prong malice and petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus. 'The defendant argued that his attorney was ineffective
because he failed to argue that the trial judge's instructions on malice were
erroneous due to the inclusion of the traditional "grievous bodily harm"
language." The federal district court judge had to determine whether the trial
judge had a rational basis for determining that the appellate counsel's performance
constituted effective assistance even though the attorney did not argue that the
judge's third-prong malice instruction was clearly erroneous given the SJC's
rulings."'The defendant argued that although Avellar was argued before the
Viscarrondo decision, his attorney should have argued based on the clear line of
cases leading up to Vizcarrondo.' The district court found that given the history
of SJC decisions on malice, counsel's failure to make the argument on third prong
malice did not fall outside "the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. '  In reaching this conclusion, the District Court judge discussed the
tortured history of SJC decisions in an attempt to determine what the state of
Massachusetts law was at various stages of the case at hand. First, he cited the
expansive definition of first degree malice in Puleio.'79 The judge then discussed
the "somewhat confused state of the law" at the time that the Avellar jury was
instructed due to the recent SJC decisions in Grey 8'and Sama,'8' which the court
decided on the same day with seemingly different statements to define malice. 2
Before the Avellar briefs were filed, the court decided Sires,'83 which made a
seemingly unequivocal statement on third prong malice. Still, in 1994 the SJC
seemed to reopen the question with their decisions in Delaney"8 4 and Pierce.'85
Only with Vizcarrondo did the court seem to settle on a definition of third prong
173 See Avellar v. Dubois, 30 F.Supp.2d 76 (D. Mass. 1998).
171 Id. at 87.
175 id.
176 See id. at 97-98.
177 See id. at 95.
178 See id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
179 See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Puleio, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Mass. 1985)).
180 See Grey, 505 N.E.2d at 171.
18I See Sama, 582 N.E.2d at 498.
182 See Avellar, 30 F.Supp. 2d at 96.
183 See Sires, 596 N.E.2d at 1018.
184 See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 639 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Mass. 1994).
185 See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 642 N.E.2d 579, 585 (Mass. 1994).
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malice." 6 The Avellar case demonstrates the confusion that this line of homicide
cases has caused. At each stage of that case, the law, as determined by the state's
highest court, appeared different.
b. Bad Public Policy
Removing the "grievous bodily injury" standard from second prong malice limits
the number of people who can be convicted of first-degree murder. The removal of
the same language from third prong malice, however, potentially has a much
greater impact on the law of murder in that homicides that the legal community and
the public alike always considered murder would now be involuntary manslaughter.
As one commentator points out, murder is practically and symbolically a very
different crime from manslaughter.187 A person who kills with malice is labeled a
murderer, society's most profound brand of criminality. In contrast, there is no
similar brand for a person convicted of manslaughter.' In addition, the difference
in penalty is significant. The penalty for involuntary manslaughter recommended
by the recent Massachusetts Sentencing Commission may be as low as 3.3 - 5 years
in prison.189 The Vizcarrondo standard excuses defendants who commit reckless
acts despite the plain and strong probability of grievous bodily injury to another
victim from facing a murder charge, a possible life sentence, or the label of
"murderer."
Whether intent to inflict grievous bodily injury should be considered first or
second-degree murder, or even involuntary manslaughter, is not a new topic. In
1934, Professor Perkins argued that intent to cause great bodily harm should give
rise to a rebuttable inference that there was in fact an actual intent to kill. 90 Even if
the inference is overcome, the accused is still guilty of murder, but under many
statutes it may be a different degree of murder than it would be if the purpose to
cause death had been established. 9 ' Professor Perkins offered several examples of
acts that demonstrate an intent to inflict great bodily injury, even if there is no
intent to cause death: (1) where the defendant shot at the deceased, or (2) cut him
across the neck with a razor, or (3) hit him over the head with a heavy iron bar, or
(4) threw a heavy glass tumbler, or a rock "the size of a man's fist," or (5) choked
him violently.1
9 2
Each of Professor Perkins' examples, however, carries a high probability of
death. Alternatively, Professor Romero states, "[a] death that results from an act
that risks great bodily harm but not involving a high probability of death might
suffice for involuntary manslaughter, but not for murder. Murder should be
186 See Avellar, 30 F.Supp.2d at 96.
187 See Mounts, supra note 49, at 314.
188 See id.
189 REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SENTENCING COMMISSION (1997).





reserved for deaths caused by indifference to the value of life."'93 The difficulty
comes when the death involves an unarmed assault, such as a punch with a fist.
Such a punch, when directed to the head or Massachusetts Sentencing Commission
may be as low as 3.3 - 5 years in prison. 194 The Vizcarrondo standard excuses
defendants who commit reckless acts despite the plain and strong probability of
grievous bodily injury to another from facing a murder charge, a possible life
sentence, or the label of "murderer."
Whether intent to inflict grievous bodily injury should be considered first or
second-degree murder, or even involuntary manslaughter, is not a new topic. In
1934, Professor Perkins argued that intent to cause great bodily harm should give
rise to a rebuttable inference that there was in fact an actual intent to kill.'95 Even if
the inference is overcome, the accused is still guilty of murder, but under many
statutes it may be a different degree of murder than if the purpose to cause death
had been established. 96 Professor Perkins offered several examples of acts that
demonstrate an intent to inflict great bodily injury, even if there is no intent to
cause death: (1) where the defendant shot at the deceased, or (2) cut him across the
neck with a razor, or (3) hit him over the head with a heavy iron bar, or (4) threw a
heavy glass tumbler, or a rock "the size of a man's fist," or (5) choked him
violently.'97
Each of Professor Perkins' examples, however, carries a high probability of
death. Alternatively, Professor Romero states, "[a] death that results from an act
that risks great bodily harm but not involving a high probability of death might
suffice for involuntary manslaughter, but not for murder. Murder should be
reserved for deaths caused by indifference to the value of life."' 9 The difficulty
comes when the death involves an unarmed assault, such as a punch with a fist.
Such a punch, when directed to the head or face may be expected to cause pain, and
perhaps injury such as a broken nose or jaw, but would not meet the standard of
grievous bodily harm in homicide cases.' 99 Nevertheless, these attacks rise to the
level of malice aforethought if there is a disparity between the assailant and his
victim, for example, a victim who is very young, very old, or disabled or if the
beating continues over a long period of time. In addition, although a kick would
not normally be sufficient for malice aforethought, it would be malice, however, if
the assailant stamps upon a prostrate victim until death ensues.2"' The role of the
jury is to determine whether the crime constitutes manslaughter or, whether they
193 Romero, supra note 150, at 62 (citing DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
461-62 (1987), LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 40, at 618.
194 REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SENTENCING COMMISSION (1996) at 27.
195 Perkins, supra note 12, at 554-55.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 Romero, supra note 150, at 62 (citing DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
461-62 (1987), LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 40, at 618.
199 Perkins, supra note 12, at 555.
200 See id.
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can infer malice from a strong probability of grievous bodily harm, and find the
crime constitutes murder.
The effect of Vizcarrondo is that the SJC eliminated this entire class of
intentional acts from the murder category. Even multiple and intentional blows to
an infant may be no more than involuntary manslaughter. What the court deems to
be injuries where the jury can "ineluctably infer" malice remains to be seen. Will
any unarmed assault rise to this level? Given the holding in Vizcarrondo, that is
doubtful. Regardless, Vizcarrondo signals another dramatic reduction in what
constitutes murder.
c. Abrogation of the Legislative Prerogative
Whether the changes are good public policy or not, the SJC significantly
transformed the law of murder through many changes to the traditional definition
of malice. Since "malice" is a common law concept that has no statutory definition
the SJC was probably within its power to interpret malice as it saw fit. The court,
however, has a responsibility to explain its reasons for making such sweeping
changes. At minimum, the court should acknowledge when it is breaking with past
legal doctrines and is creating new law. The SJC has yet to make these
acknowledgements. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Legislature to decide
what is criminal activity and how that activity should be punished. If there are
severe changes to the law of murder, that task should go to the Legislature and not
the courts. The policy considerations of changing the knowledge requirement in
third prong malice, or for removing the grievous bodily injury language from
second and third prong malice should have been done in a formal legislative
process that includes notice to affected parties and a public debate. If there are
limitations on the law of murder the limitations should reflect the will of the
people, not the justices of the SJC.
B. Murder by Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty
A killing committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty falls under murder of the
first degree."' Extreme atrocity or cruelty is in and of itself enough to justify a
first-degree murder charge.20 2  However, it does not require deliberate
premeditation, but only requires proof of malice aforethought.2 3 Additionally, a
defendant is not required to be aware that his actions were either extremely
atrocious or cruel.204 Rather, it is for the jury to determine.
201 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1 (1998).
202 NOLAN & HENRY, supra note 73, at ch. 8 § 183.
203 See id.
204 "A murder committed with malice aforethought may be found to have been committed
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even though the murderer did not know that his act was
extremely atrocious or cruel." Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 42 N.E. 336. 338 (Mass. 1895).
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Until recently, the SJC loosely spelled out a number of factors that a jury may
consider when deciding whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or
cruelty: "(1) indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, (2)
consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim, (3) extent of physical injuries,
(4) number of blows, (5) manner and force of delivery, (6) instrument employed,
and (7) disproportion between the means needed to cause death and those actually
employed.""2 5 Still, the jury was left to decide what killings were committed with
extreme atrocity or cruelty based on all of the facts of the case and whether it
included savagery, brutality or indifference to the victim's suffering.2 6 In the last
twenty years, however, the SJC limited this part of the murder statute and
introduced a mental element for this form of first degree murder and declared the
list of factors for atrocity or cruelty exclusive.
1. Commonwealth v. Gould: Diminished Capacity?
Starting in 1980, the SJC significantly altered the doctrine of extreme atrocity or
cruelty, by insisting that juries consider the defendants' mental state when
determining whether their actions were cruel or extremely atrocious. In
Commonwealth v. Gould,2 7 the SJC all but established a new rule of diminished
capacity within this area of murder. In this case, the defendant fatally stabbed his
former girlfriend while suffering from mental illness. 208 After a trial in which
criminal responsibility was the sole issue, the jury convicted the defendant of first-
degree murder on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.0 9 On
See also Commonwealth v. Monsen, 385 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Mass. 1979) ("considering the
legislative intent with respect to the principal, it would be inconsistent to require a showing
of intent beyond that of malice aforethought in order to convict an accomplice of a murder
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty"); Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744,
752 (Mass. 1977) (finding that there is no requirement that the defendant know that his act
was extremely atrocious or cruel, and no requirement of deliberate premeditation). See
generally Commonwealth v. Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927, 933 n.14 (Mass. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Clifford, 372 N.E.2d 1267, 1276-77 (1978); Commonwealth v. Lacy, 358
N.E.2d 419, 423 (Mass. 1976). But see John C. Williams, Annot. What Constitutes Murder
by Torture, 83 A.L.R. 1222 (1978) (discussing rules of other States).
205 Cunneen, 449 N.E.2d 658 at 664. See, e.g., Monsen, 385 N.E.2d at 990; Strother, 366
N.E.2d at 752 (noting that "[t]he size and nature of the weapon used, the number of blows,
the manner and force with which they were delivered, and the target at which the blows were
directed" are among the factors supporting a determination of extreme atrocity or cruelty);
Golston, 366 N.E.2d at 752.
206 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253, 255 (1879) ("[t]he question is left
largely for the determination of the jury to consider whether the case presents a case of such
savage, unfeeling, [and] long-continued brutality").
207 See Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927 (1980).
208 See id. at 673 (stating that the defendant had suffered from delusions for five years).
209 See id.
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appeal, the defendant argued that the jurors "should have been able to have
considered the manner of the homicide [as it] related to the defendant's mental
illness."21  The court agreed and overturned the conviction stating that mental
illness should be a consideration when the jury considers both deliberate
premeditation"' and extreme atrocity or cruelty.
21 2
After enumerating several traditional factors of extreme atrocity or cruelty,"1 3 the
court reasoned that a "malicious mind [was] evidence that a defendant committed a
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty."2 4 In fairness, therefore, evidence of an
impaired mind should be considered as to whether the murder was committed with
extreme atrocity or cruelty:
The jurors' broad discretion will more accurately reflect the community's
conscience, goals, and norms, if the jurors are not arbitrarily restricted to
considering only the defendant's course of action, but are also permitted to
consider the defendant's peculiar mental state as an additional factor to be
weighed in determining whether the murder was committed with extreme
atrocity or cruelty. 215
The court argued, however, that this decision did not adopt the doctrine of
diminished capacity despite this clear addition of a mental element.2 6
The court's new rule drew a sharp rebuttal from Justice Quirico joined by Chief
Justice Hennessey."' Justice Quirico distinguished between premeditation and
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Since the prosecution has the burden of proving
capacity for premeditation introducing a diminished capacity rule would severely
affect the theory of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.21 Justice Quirico
210 Id. at 933.
211 See id. at 932. Although at the time there was precedent for a jury to consider the use
of intoxicating liquor or drugs when determining if the defendant had the required element of
deliberate premeditation for first-degree murder, there was no similar rule for mental illness.
If a defendant who has voluntarily used alcohol or drugs is found by the jury to be incapable
of deliberately premeditating the acts charged, he may not be found guilty of murder in the
first degree but may be found guilty of murder in the second degree. See id, (citing
Commonwealth v. Costa, 274 N.E.2d 802, 808 (Mass. 1971)); Commonwealth v. Delle
Chiaie, 84 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Mass. 1949); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 161 N.E. 245, 248 (Mass.
1928).
212 See Gould, 405 N.E.2d at 932
213 See id. (stating that the Court was taking pleasure in causing the victim pain).
214 Id. at 934.
215 Id. (pointing the reader to Monsen, 385 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. 1979)).
216 See id.
217 See id. at 935-39.
21i Id. at 935-36. Justice Quirico's reasons that the "Commonwealth has always had the
role of proving the element of deliberate premeditation, and that impliedly includes the
burden of proving that the defendant had the capacity to deliberately premeditate the
homicide." See id. at 936.
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argued that in previous cases, the jury was never required to consider the
defendant's mental state on a theory of extreme atrocity. 219 By introducing a
mental element, the court had, in fact, made "diminished capacity as a partial
defense to the crime of murder in the first degree when committed with extreme
atrocity or cruelty."22 The court's decision, therefore, was a "judicial attempt to
rewrite a legislative definition of what constitutes one of the three types of murder
in the first degree" and "will erode a legislative mandate which has passed judicial
scrutiny in a number of decisions by this court since 1858."221  In fact, the
precedent clearly indicates that "[a] murder committed with malice aforethought
may be found to have been committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even
though the murderer did not know that his act was extremely atrocious or cruel.
222
The SJC upheld this principle as recently as one year before Gould:
To import a mens rea requirement into the words 'extreme atrocity or cruelty'
would be to blur the distinction between that form of murder in the first degree
[murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty] and the premeditated
variety. Rather, we think that the Legislature intended to exact [upon an
accomplice] the greater punishment of the principal solely on the basis of the
shocking, unnecessary, and often painful manner in which the death has been
caused. Although the inference that the actor possesses a particularly brutal
state of mind might be warranted by the objective circumstances of the killing,
no such inference is necessary in order to convict.223
Based on this long line of precedent, Justice Quirico concluded that the
legislature should decide whether to introduce the theory of diminished capacity as
a mitigating factor in murders committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
24
Since Gould, the court continues to insist that the jury consider a defendant's
mental state when determining whether a murder was committed with extreme
atrocity or cruelty. In Commonwealth v. Perry,225 the defendant killed his wife by
intentionally lighting a fire in her bedroom. The defendant was convicted of first
219 Id. at 937.
220 Id. at 938.
221 Id. Justice Quirico relies on Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 42 N.E. 336 (Mass. 1895),
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 265 N.E.2d 485 (Mass. 1970), and Monsen, 385 N.E.2d at 990.
In Gilbert, the Court found that a defendant could not have the required malice aforethought
if he was too intoxicated at the time of the crime to deliberately premeditate the homicide.
The Court also pondered whether murder in the first degree by reason of extreme atrocity
and cruelty required the defendant to know that the act of killing was attended with extreme
atrocity or cruelty. In that case, the Court found that it was not, because the theory of
extreme atrocity or cruelty was a separate and distinct ground of first-degree murder from
that of deliberately premeditated murder. See Gould, 405 N.E.2d at 938 (citing Gilbert, 42
N.E. at 338).
222 Gilbert, 42 N.E. at 338.
223 Gould, 405 N.E.2d at 939 (quoting Monsen, 385 N.E.2d at 990) (alteration in
original).
224 See id.
225 433 N.E.2d 446 (Mass 1982).
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degree murder, in part on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.226 The defendant
argued on appeal that the jury instructions on extreme atrocity and cruelty were
incorrect because the judge refused to give a Gould type of instruction that the
defendant's extreme intoxication at the time of the crime affected his mental
state.227 The court reasoned that in light of Gould, it was a jury consideration
whether the defendant's intoxication at the time of the murder was so great as to
reduce the defendant's criminal culpability.22 Ultimately, the court reduced the
conviction to second-degree murder.229
An interesting footnote to Perry stated that the court did not "consider the
question [of] whether the common meaning of 'cruel' and 'atrocious' requires [a]
mental element, in addition to malice aforethought, for conviction of murder in the
first degree based on extreme atrocity and cruelty."23 Still, the court gave the
Webster dictionary definition for "cruel"2' and "atrocious," '32 perhaps suggesting
that it would consider extending the Gould decision by requiring a mental element
for extreme atrocity or cruelty.
In the 1983 case of Commonwealth v. Cunneen, the SJC revisited the issue of
requiring a mental element for extreme atrocity or cruelty as raised in the Perry
footnote.2 33 In Cuneen the defendant argued that under Gould and Perry "extreme
atrocity or cruelty [can only be found where] the defendant had a specific mental
intent or knowledge of the character of his [or her] acts beyond the malice
aforethought required for murder in the second degree.2 34  Chief Justice
Hennessey, now writing for the court accepted the Gould decision that he
previously dissented to,235 but he refused to make intent an "entirely new element
of the crime of murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty. '2 36 The result
of such an extension would be to blur the line between killing with extreme atrocity
or cruelty and premeditated killings. He reasoned that "[a]lthough the inference
226 See id.
227 See id. at 452-53. The judge instructed: "[i]f you find the murder to be of extreme
atrocity and cruelty because of the effect upon the body of the victim, then whether [the
defendant] was drunk or not does not matter." Id. at 452 (quoting lower court's opinion)
(alteration in original).
228 See id. at 453.
229 See id.
230 Id. at 435 n.14.
231 Id. (defining "cruel" as "disposed to give pain to others... ) (quoting WEBSTER'S
SECOND NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 635 (1959)).
232 Id. (defining "atrocious" as "savagely brutal; outrageously...) (quoting WEBSTER'S
SECOND INT'L DICTIONARY 176 (1959)).
233 Cunneen, 449 N.E.2d at 664.
234 Id.
235 See id. at 665. ("Thus, we have diluted the objective test to some extent, since
indifference to or pleasure in the victim's pain, as well as a defendant's reduced mental
capacity, is considered relevant.") Justice Abrams remarks upon the "grudging" acceptance
of Gould in her dissent. See id. at 667.
236 Id. at 665.
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that the actor possesses a particularly brutal state of mind might be warranted by
the objective circumstances of the killing, no such inference is necessary in order to
convict. ,237 Although the court continues to hold that a jury may consider evidence
of the defendant's mental retardation,"' intoxication 21 and prolonged mental
illness,24 the court has, so far, resisted the argument to make intent an element of
extreme atrocity or cruelty.
2 4 1
Some argue that the Gould holding "constituted a rational revision of the law.
242
Perhaps this change is acceptable because it only affects the degree of murder, and
still allows the jury to make its determination on the totality of the circumstances.
In addition, the court continues to resist the next step of introducing a mental
element. Still, the changes have occurred through judicial fiat and without any
public process. Equally important, the court could revise its position on this issue
and make intent an element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, which would further
confuse the law of murder.
3. The Narrowing of "Extreme Atrocity"
In Commonwealth v. Hunter the SJC made another significant limitation on a
jury's ability to find murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or
cruelty.243 Until 1994 the jury was free to determine when the mode of inflicting
death was so shocking as to amount to extreme atrocity or cruelty.2" Hunter
limited the jury to only the factors previously identified in Cunneen.24 Once again,
this significant change to the law of murder was done with no explanation, and
without even an indication that it was a departure from previous decisions.
In Cunneen, the court identified several factors that a jury could consider in
deciding whether a killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.2" They
237 Id. at 229 ( citing Monsen, 385 N.E.2d at 984). See also Gilbert, 42 N.E. 336;
Commonwealth v. Desmarteau, 82 Mass. 1 (1860).
238 See Cunneen, 449 N.E.2d 658.
239 See Perry, 433 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 1982).
240 See Gould, 405 N.E.2d at 933-35.
241 See Sinnott, 507 N.E.2d at 709. This ruling was later reiterated and upheld in 1989.
See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989). Commonwealth v. James,
427 693 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Mass. 1998). See also, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON HOMICIDE
(1999).
242 McMahon, supra note 156, at 43.
243 626 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1994).
244 See Commonwealth v. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253, 255 (1879) (stating that the jury must
determine whether the case is one of "savage, unfeeling, and long continued brutality"). See
also Commonwealth v. Lacy, 358 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Mass. 1976) ("[T]he issue of [extreme
atrocity or cruelty] must be left largely to the deliberation of the jury .. "); Golsion, 366
N.E.2d at 752 ("[i]ndifference to the victim's pain, as well as actual knowledge of it and
taking pleasure in it, is cruelty; and extreme cruelty is only a higher degree of cruelty.").
245 See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 626 N.E.2d 873 (Mass. 1994).
246 See Cunneen, 449 N.E.2d at 665.
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became widely referred to in subsequent case law as the "Cunneen factors:"
We have delineated a number of factors which a jury can consider in deciding
whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. These
include indifference to or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering,
consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim, extent of physical
injuries, number of blows, manner and force with which delivered, instrument
employed, and disproportion between the means needed to cause death and
those employed. 247
The court found that the trial judge appropriately instructed the jury on the
factors identified above.248 In addition, the judge's instructions also included
several illustrative opinions on the subject, such as: the question is left largely for
the determination of the jury to consider whether the case presents a case of such
savage, unfeeling, and long-continued brutality,2 49 and that "indifference to the
victim's pain" is an appropriate factor.250
The SJC consistently cited the Cunneen factors as the standard for extreme
atrocity or cruelty."' Still, the court also clearly stated that the Cunneen factors are
not exhaustive, nor does the trial judge have a mandatory burden to recite each and
every factor.252 In 1994, however, the court took the opportunity to make the
Cunneen factors exclusive.253 In Commonwealth v. Hunter, the jury convicted the
defendant of first degree murder under theories of deliberate premeditation and
extreme atrocity or cruelty for shooting his estranged wife repeatedly with a semi-
automatic rifle. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth had
to prove that the defendant caused the victim's death "by a method which surpassed
the cruelty inherent in any taking of human life."254 The judge also listed as part of
his instructions a number of factors found in Cunneen for consideration by the jury,
but also instructed that "extreme atrocity or cruelty is not limited to such cases of
such evidence." '255  On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge's
instructions on the issue of extreme atrocity or cruelty were unconstitutionally
247 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Monsen, 385 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. 1979)); Commonwealth
v. Strother, 378 N.E.2d 958, 959 (Mass. 1978); Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744
(Mass. 1979).
248 id.
249 See Devlin, 126 Mass. at 255.
250 Golston, 366 N.E.2d. at 752.
251 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 540 N.E.2d 1289, 1294-96 (Mass. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Mass. 1984).
252 See Doucette, 462 N.E.2d at 1094 (Mass. 1984) (citing Commonwealth v. Cunneen,
389 Mass. at 227 for its "recitation of a number of factors which a jury can consider when
deciding whether a murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty"). The Doucette
court then remarked that the Cunneen factors although not exhaustive, are entirely
acceptable.") Id.
253 See Hunter, 626 N.E.2d 873.




vague.256 The court agreed and found error with the judge's instructions stating that
"the instructions in this case improperly permitted the jury to find extreme atrocity
or cruelty without finding that any of the [Cunneen] factors was present." 2" To
justify this pronouncement the court simply stated "[t]his is inconsistent with our
case law.
258
The Model Jury Instructions perpetuated this rule. After listing the Cunneen
factors the Instructions read: "[y]ou can not make a finding of extreme atrocity or
cruelty unless it is based on one or more of the factors I have just listed. 259
Given the incredible number of ways in which people are cruel to one another,
neither the Instructions nor case law should limit this area of law. Additionally, the
court sharply limited the jury's traditional role of deciding what constitutes extreme
atrocity or cruelty, as well as the jury's statutory role of deciding what degree of
murder is appropriate. Once again, if we are to define and reduce to a hard and fast
rule, the rule for extreme atrocity or cruelty, it is the Legislature that should
undertake this task.
C. Felony-Murder
Murder in Massachusetts, like many jurisdictions, may also be proven by a
felony-murder theory. This theory, while academically unpopular, is politically
popular, and therefore, very difficult to abolish. In the last twenty years, the SJC
joined the prevalent trend among courts and theorists and limited the situations
where a court can sentence a person for murder on a felony murder theory. Once
again, however, the court made these changes without regard to the intentions of
the Legislature and fashioned these changes without necessarily reflecting the
public will.
1. Unpopularity of the Felony Murder Rule
The felony-murder rule punishes all homicides committed in the perpetration of
a felony whether the death is intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the
necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator's state of mind to the homicide.
Justice Coke may have viewed any homicide resulting from any unlawful act as
murder, 2" but few who came after him agreed. Justice Hale classified some
unlawful acts that resulted in death as manslaughter.26 ' Other commentators, such
256 See id.
257 id.
258 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 540 N.E.2d 1289, 1294-96 (Mass. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d 1084, 1094 (Mass. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Podlaski, 385 N.E.2d 1379, 1385 (Mass. 1979)).
259 MODEL INSTRUCTIONS ON HOMICIDE 14 (1999).
260 See 3 COKE INST. 56 (1797).
261 See 1 HALE P.C. 475 (1847).
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as Foster and Blackstone, restricted murder to deaths that resulted from criminal
acts that were malum in se, or felonies at the common law.262 Today, many judges
and legal scholars continue to view the felony-murder rule with disdain. Critics
hold the felony-murder rule violates the most fundamental principle of the criminal
law that states that "criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified
in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result." '263 Some
courts applied the felony-murder rule "where the law requires, but they do so
grudgingly and tend to restrict its application where circumstances permit."2 64
With Judge Fitzjames Stephen taking the lead, England limited its traditional
felony-murder rule in the late 19th century. In Regina v. Serne, the jury was
instructed that a death resulting from the commission of a felony was only murder
if the underlying felony was inherently dangerous. 265
The limitation expressed in Regina v. Sterne has proven popular with several
states that retain the felony-murder rule.266 The drafters of the Model Penal Code
cite several other felony-murder limitations in American statutes and case law:
(1) The felonious act must be dangerous to life.... (2) The homicide must be
a natural and probable consequence of the felonious act.... (3) Death must be
'proximately' caused .... (4) The felony must be malum in se .... (5) The act
must be a common law felony.... (6) The period during which the felony is
in the process of commission must be narrowly construed.... [and] (7) The
underlying felony must be 'independent' of the homicide.
2 67
262 See FOSTER C.C. 258 (1791); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *200-01
(1897).
263 People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 316 (Mich. 1980) (quoting Bernard E. Gegan,
Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F. 565, 586 (1966)).
264 PERKINS, supra note 109, at 44.
265 See Regina v. Seine, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311. 313 (Cent. Crim Ct. 1887). In that
case it was alleged that Serne and another set fire to a house and shop in order to collect
the insurance proceeds. Seme's son died in the fire, and the prisoner was charged with
murder. The jury was instructed on the felony-murder rule as follows:
[T]he definition of the law which makes it murder to kill by an act done in the
commission of a felony might and ought to be narrowed .... [I]nstead of saying that
any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder,
it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in
itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death,
should be murder.
Id.
266 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965); People v. Goldvarg, 178
N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1931); State v. Moffitt, 413 P.2d 879 (Kan. 1967); State v. Thompson, 185
S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1972); Wade v. State, 581 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1973); TEX PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §
19.02(a)(3) (West 1974).
267 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4C (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) (citations
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Some commentators, however, argue that confining the rule to inherently
dangerous felonies is inadequate. For instance, Professor Perkins argues that you
cannot limit the rule to just "dangerous" crimes, because one who is perpetrating a
felony which does not in itself involve any element of human risk may resort to a
dangerous method of committing the crime or use dangerous force to deter others
from interfering.26 Rather, Professor Perkins suggests limiting the felony-murder
rule to situations where the commission of a felony creates any substantial risk of
harm that actually results in the loss of life.269 The danger of felony-murder may
fall considerably short of a plain and strong likelihood that death or great bodily
harm will result, but must not be so remote that no reasonable man would have
taken it into consideration.270 Since felony-murder already requires a criminal act,
the situation created does not have to be so obviously dangerous as required for
third prong malice. This theory assumes that a felony is reckless per se, and
therefore, any substantial human risk is enough.
Ultimately, the drafters of the Model Penal Code eliminated the concept of
felony-murder in favor of a presumption of the necessary recklessness to constitute
murder drawn from the commission of certain crimes. 7' The Model Penal Code
specifies robbery, arson, burglary, sexual assault by force, kidnapping and escape
as the felonies whose attempt or commission creates a presumption of the
recklessness required for murder.272
In addition to the Model Penal Code, the felony-murder rule has been besieged
on other fronts as well. 273 Though often attacked, it has never been entirely
defeated. For example, when the Wisconsin Judicial Council recommended a new
homicide statute for its state, the Council called for the repeal of felony murder,
which was considered second-degree murder in that state.274 Several members of
omitted).
268 See Perkins, supra note 12, at 561.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 562-63.
271 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 36-37 (1985).
One who kills in the course of armed robbery is almost certainly guilty of murder in the
form of intentional or extremely reckless homicide without any need of special doctrine.
Similarly, a man who burns another's house will scarcely be heard to complain that he
lacks the culpability for murder if the blaze kills a sleeping occupant. For the vast
majority of cases it is probably true that homicide occurring during the commission or
attempted commission of a felony is murder independent of the felony-murder rule.
Id.
272 See id. at § 210.2(l)(b).
273 See, e.g., LAFAvE & ScOT, supra note 40, at 560-61 (1972); MORELAND, supra note
6,49-53.
274 See Walter Dickey Et Al., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The
Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1323, 1364. The rationale for this proposal was a
belief that virtually any homicide committed during the course of another felony would be a
serious criminal homicide under a different statute. Id. This article also notes that drafters
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the Judicial Council argued that the felony-murder rule was a "dead letter" and
allowed juries to use felony-murder as a lesser included offense, and was therefore,
a compromise position.275 This proposal, however, "proved to be politically
unpopular", and was "restored to the Judicial Council draft in a revised form." '276
The revised form included recreating felony murder as a separate crime rather than
as a type of second-degree murder, was limited to five specified felonies, 77 and the
penalty was changed to allow for up to twenty years in addition to the penalty for
the underlying felony. 278
Although the trend is to limit or eliminate the felony-murder rule, not all
commentators agree. One scholarly defense of the rule argued that there are
substantial policies that are furthered by the rule.279 Most persuasive, and perhaps
the key to the felony-murder rule's resiliency, is that the rule offers a rational,
proportional grading of offenses. The felony-murder rule acknowledges a
widespread public perception that serious crimes, such as robbery, rape, and
burglary that result in death are not simply a more serious version of the underlying
felony. Rather it is a different crime altogether, one that rises to the level of
murder. 280
Despite the felony-murder rule's longstanding unpopularity with legal scholars,
its continuing popularity with the public means that many jurisdictions will
continue to keep it on the books. 2' The question is, if it is to exist, who should
of the Wisconsin 1955 criminal code revision also attempted to abolish felony-murder. Id. at
1366.
275 See id. at 1367. The abolitionists on the council argued that this "compromise" effect
was a widely used defense position "premised on raising a reasonable doubt [on] intent and
giving [a] jury a less serious verdict which 'fit the facts.' A jury unable to reach unanimity
on intent might compromise by returning a verdict of felony murder .. " Id.
276 Id. at 1364-65.
277 Those felonies are: "armed robbery, armed burglary, arson, first-degree sexual assault,
and second degree sexual assault by use or threat of force." See id. at 1365.
278 See id.
279 See David Crump & Susan Wait Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1985).
280 See id. at 361-76. The other reasons given to support the existence of a felony-murder
rule are: (2) it serves the interests in properly condemning as a homicide a felony that causes
death; Id. at 367-68 (3) it "is just the sort of simple, commonsense, readily enforceable, and
widely known principle that is likely to result in deterrence;" Id. at 370-71 (4) a felony
murder statute can be drafted clearly and simply, avoiding the need to struggle with difficult
or complex matters like intent, recklessness, premeditation, etc.; Id.(5) it has beneficial
consequences on the optimal allocation of criminal justice system resources because it
"simplifies the task of the judge and jury, thereby promoting efficient administration of
justice" Id. at 375 and, (6) it minimizes the usefulness of perjury which is encouraged by
relying on crimes requiring intent (which offer defendants an inducement to falsely deny
acting with intent). Id. at 375-76
281 For example, Professor Hobson recommends that California retain the felony murder
rule if and when the statute is re-written. See Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California 's
Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 495, 530-36 (1996).
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limit the rule's scope and in what way should it be limited.
2. Massachusetts Rule
By statute and case law, Massachusetts traditionally followed a wide-open
felony-murder rule. "[a]s developed by the case law, the felony-murder rule in the
Commonwealth imposes criminal liability for homicide on all participants in a
certain common criminal enterprise if a death occurred in the course of that
enterprise. 282 To prove murder the prosecutor need "only... establish that the
defendant had committed a homicide while engaged in the commission of a
felony. 2 1' Neither malice aforethought nor premeditation was required for a
murder conviction under the felony-murder rule.284 Furthermore, the defendant is
not helped by a defense that he did not intend to kill.285 Until 1982, the only court
imposed limitation on the felony-murder rule was that a homicide committed
during a felony had to be the natural and probable consequence of the act.
28 6
Finally, the statute clearly states that a homicide that occurs in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment is first
degree murder.28 7
In contradiction to the seemingly clear language of the murder statute, in 1982
the SJC limited the felony-murder rule, deciding which felonies specifically apply
to the felony-murder rule. In Commonwealth v. Matchett, the defendant went to the
282 Commonwealth v. Watkins, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 1049 (Mass. 1978). See also
Commonwealth v. Walden, 405 N.E.2d 939, 944 n.2 (Mass. 1980). Commonwealth v.
Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Mass. 1965).
283 Watkins, 379 N.E.2d at 1049.
284 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Mass. 1995);
Commonwealth v. Moran, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Mass. 1982); Commonwealth v. Devlin,
141 N.E.2d 269, 275-76 (Mass. 1957) (Malice aforethought not required); Commonwealth v.
Gricus, 58 N.E.2d 241, 245-46 (Mass. 1944).
285 See Commonwealth v. Dellelo, 209 N.E.2d 303, 307 (Mass. 1965).
286 See Devlin, 141 N.E.2d at 274-75; Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d 370, 377-78
(Mass. 1990).
287 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 265 §1. Commonwealth v. Pope, 549 N.E.2d 1120, 1123
(Mass. 1990). Currently, there are 31 felonies that carry a maximum penalty of life in prison
and may be considered "inherently dangerous" or likely to lead to murder. This list includes:
murder; treason; manslaughter involving explosives; kidnapping for extortion; attempted
poisoning; and perjury in the trial of a capital case. Seven crimes involving robbery carry
maximum penalties of life in prison: armed robbery; armed assault in dwelling; home
invasion; armed burglary with assault on occupants; unarmed robbery of a person over the
age of 60 (subsequent offense); confine or put in fear to steal; and unarmed robbery. Several
sex crimes carry possible life sentences: rape (subsequent offense); aggravated rape; rape of
child with force; assault to rape child (subsequent offense); assault to rape a child; indecent
assault and battery on a child under the age of 14 (subsequent offense); statutory rape of a
child; and assault to rape (subsequent offense). Two life penalties are possible for firearms
violations: trafficking in firearms; possession of a machine gun or sawed-off shotgun. Id.
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victim's house armed with two loaded handguns, a sawed-off shotgun, a large dog,
a knife, and a pair of handcuffs in order to collect a gambling debt. 288 The
extortion ended in the shooting death of the debtor and the jury convicted the
defendant of murder in the second degree.289 The court found the felony-murder
rule inapplicable to the statutory crime of extortion unless the circumstances
demonstrate the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk to human life.29 The
court held that if the intent to commit the felony is to be the equivalent of malice
aforethought, the intent to commit a crime must exhibit "a conscious disregard for
human life, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind
regardless of social duty."29' The court identified several statutory felonies that did
not meet this standard, such as possession of burglarious instruments and buying or
receiving stolen property, which in addition to being less serious than the common
law felonies, have no natural tendency to cause death. 292 Since "the crime of
extortion could be committed in a way not inherently dangerous to human life,"
there can be no conviction of felony-murder in the second degree unless the jury
finds that the extortion involved circumstances demonstrating the defendant's
conscious disregard of the risk to human life.293 This decision drew a dissenting
opinion from Justice Nolan,' who stated that, "It borders on the fanciful to deny
that one of the natural and probable consequences of such attempted extortion is
homicide." '295 Justice Nolan further stated that the facts in this case indicated that
the defendant's criminal activity might have been just as dangerous as crimes that
are routinely used to prove felony-murder such as arson, burglary, robbery and
larceny.296 He objected to the Court's reluctance to apply extortion to felony-
murder "simply because extortion was a misdemeanor at common law." '297 Rather,
according to Justice Nolan, the court should have looked at the present statutory
status of extortion.298
288 See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 402-03 (Mass. 1982).
289 See id. at 404-07.
290 See id. at 411. "The judge told the jury that murder in the first degree could be found
based on deliberately premeditated malice aforethought or the felony-murder rule, with the
underlying felony being an armed assault in a dwelling house with intent to commit a
felony." See id. at 404.
29' Matchett, 436 N.E.2d at 410 (citing Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714, 719
(Pa. 1973) (Nix, J., concurring). See also, HOLMES, supra note 33, at 58; PERKINS, supra
note 109, at 44.
292 See Matchett, 436 N.E.2d at 410.
293 Id. at 410 (citing Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d 146 (Del. 1968), aff'd, 395 U.S. 213
(1969)).
294 See id. at 412.
295 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Devlin, 141 N.E.2d 269, 275-76 (Mass. 1957)).
296 See id.
297 Id.
298 See Matchett, 436 N.E.2d at 412. Extortion is a statutory felony punishable by
imprisonment in the State prison for a term up to fifteen years. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 265, § 25 (1998).
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Currently, the rule states that the underlying felony must have been either
inherently dangerous to human life,2 or committed with a conscious disregard for
the risk to human life.3" For example, the court has held that armed robbery,
breaking and entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, and
armed assault in a dwelling meet the standard for felony murder.3"' Similarly, the
court declared several common law felonies inherently dangerous, such as, rape,
arson, burglary, and robbery.30 2 Certain other felonies including extortion,3 3
unarmed robbery, attempted unarmed robbery, unarmed assault with intent to rob,
larceny, and attempted larceny are not generally considered inherently dangerous
by the court.3
In Matchett, the court adopted new limitations on the felony-murder rule that
accorded with other jurisdictions.30 5 Still, the Legislature and not the court should
make these limitations. The Legislature considered the role of felony-murder when
drafting the murder statute and it was well aware of the arguments for and against
the felony-murder doctrine. 306 The 1844 Penal Code Commission included several
examples of felony-murder being retained, limited, and disposed of in other
jurisdictions.0 7 The Legislature chose to retain felony-murder but limited its
application to capital cases.30 ' Whereas one may argue that the Matchett court
instituted reasonable new limitations on felony-murder, the SJC clearly imposed
elements that the Legislature chose to omit. This is an example of the court not
simply interpreting an ambiguous term, but legislating new elements of the crime.
Although the court should have shown some deference to the Legislature's
intent, it is true that felony-murder has gained broader application over the years.
Far more crimes are defined as "felonies" now than in the mid 19th century.3" In
1858, the most serious crimes were routinely made "life felonies"-with a statutory
299 See Commonwealth v. Claudio, 634 N.E.2d 902, 906 (Mass. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 700-01 (Mass. 1990).
300 See Commonwealth v. Moran, 442 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Mass. 1982); Matchett, 436
N.E.2d at 409-10.
301 See Commonwealth v. Selby, 686 N.E.2d 1316, 1320 (Mass. 1997) (armed assault in a
dwelling); Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 (Mass. 1995) (breaking and
entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony); Commonwealth v. Benjamin,
503 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Mass. 1987) (armed robbery).
302 See Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400, 408 n.15 (Mass. 1982).
303 See id. at 410.
304 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 457 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
305 See Matchett 436 N.E.2d at 410 (citing Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d 146 (Del. 1968),
aff'd, 395 U.S. 213 (1969)).
306 See MASS. COMM. ON PENAL CODE REPORT § 4 n.(c) (1844).
307 See id.
308 See id.
309 An example of this is the chapter of Massachusetts crimes entitled "Crimes Against
the Person". In 1860, there were 17 felonies listed as crimes against the person, six of which
were "life-felonies." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 160 (1860). In 2001, this chapter had grown to
27 felonies, 10 of which carried a potential life sentence. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 (2001).
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penalty of life or any number of years in prison.31 Each of these felonies could,
therefore, apply to the statutory requirement for first-degree murder. Whereas "life
felonies" are often major, dangerous crimes, they also include some non-violent
crimes. 311 These non-violent crimes were not part of felony-murder at common law
and one would be hard pressed to imagine a hypothetical where fraud by a treasury
employee or counterfeiting would unintentionally lead to homicide. Conversely,
several extremely dangerous felonies created in the last 150 years do not carry the
possibility of a life prison sentence. Deaths caused by often violent crimes
including trafficking narcotics, 12 hostage taking by a prisoner,313 car jacking,314
malicious explosion,a15 and kidnapping,316 do not carry the possibility of a first-
degree murder conviction under the current felony-murder rule.
Given the changes to the criminal law, a crime's felony classification and life
penalty status are no longer valid dividing lines for the most culpable murders. If
the Legislature chooses to retain the felony-murder rule it should perhaps limit the
rule, though not to the extent or in the manner the SJC has limited it. A clearer rule
would specify the felonies that qualify a defendant for felony murder as the
Wisconsin statute does.317 Similarly, Massachusetts could limit the felony-murder
rule by examining the underlying offense in the abstract to determine
dangerousness. That is, if the underlying felony is not "inherently dangerous," a
killing will still constitute murder if the crime is committed in a dangerous
manner." 8 This sort of test may be more easily understood than the "conscious
disregard" test created by the SJC, and it may include the armed extortion that was
not included in felony-murder in the Matchett decision.
D. Deliberately Premeditated
Premeditation is the primary dividing line between first and second-degree
murder in Massachusetts since 1858."'9 Inherent in this division is the belief that
310 See, e.g., [ Rape] MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 22; [Burglary] MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
266 § 14; [Robbery] MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 17; [Kidnapping] MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
265 §26; [Possessing Counterfeit Notes] MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267 § 9.
311 For example, the list of "life felonies" includes Fraud by a Treasury Employee, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 50; Forgery of a Commonwealth Note, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267 § 7;
Forgery of a Bank Note or Traveler's Check, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267 § 8; Possession of
Counterfeit Notes, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267 § 9.
312 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C § 32E (2000).
313 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127 § 38A (2000).
314 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 21A (2000).
315 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 101 (2000).
316 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §26 (2000).
317 See Dickey, supra note 275, at 1365.
318 In Kansas the court has limited felony-murder to felonies that are dangerous to human
life. See, e.g., State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279, 284-85 (1976). See also LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 40, at 547-48.
319 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 §1.
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premeditated murders are the most blameworthy and most deserving of the highest
punishment.32 "[D]eliberate premeditation" an unclear term subject to varying
interpretations, it is a poor indicator of relative blameworthiness. Perhaps the use
of premeditation as a dividing line between first and second-degree murder should
be discarded.
1. Difficult To Interpret
A meaningful definition of "premeditation" as it is used in first-degree murder is
elusive.32' Generally, to premeditate does not require an extended time span but
may be accomplished in a "matter of days, hours, or even seconds."322 Because the
human mind is capable of acting with extraordinary speed, the only requirement is
that "the act must not be the result of an immediate or spontaneous impulse."32
Other courts, however, ruled that premeditation that takes "no appreciable time"
destroys the statutory distinction between first and second-degree murder. 24 For
example, the high courts in Pennsylvania and California have arrived at different
interpretations of what premeditation means when prosecuting murder.
In Commonwealth v. Carroll, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a
defendant's conviction for first-degree murder based on a theory of premeditation
which states that premeditation may occur in any span of time, regardless of how
brief.325 The Pennsylvania Court rejected the defendant's argument that he did not
320 A review of state homicide statutes demonstrates the importance of premeditation
when determining the perceived severity of a killing. In New Mexico, a premeditated and
intentional murder is considered first-degree murder and is punishable by a sentence range of
a minimum of thirty years in prison without parole to the death penalty. Pauley, supra note
40, at 147. Second-degree murder in New Mexico, in stark contrast, is merely punishable by
a maximum of nine years in prison. See id. In Virginia, premeditation is the difference
between the death penalty and a prison sentence of five to twenty years in prison, "[a]
murder must fulfill all the requirements of an intentional, deliberate, and premeditated killing
to be punished by death." Id. at 146 n.4 (citing M. Patricia Walther, Should Virginia Put the
Planning Back Into The Premeditation Required For Murder? 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 341,
347 n. 33 (1983)).
321 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 40, at 643.
322 Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N.E. 127, 141-42 (Mass. 1905). See also, Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (under Virginia law, "it is well settled that premeditation need
not exist for any particular length of time, and that an intent to kill may be formed at the
moment of the commission of the unlawful act." (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 19 S.E.
447 (Va. 1894)).
323 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do For Law, LAW AND LITERATURE AND
OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES, 97-98 (1938).
324 Bullock v. U.S. 122 F.2d. 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 40,
at 643.
325 See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 1963). In Carroll, the
defendant shot his wife with a .22 caliber pistol while she was lying in bed. The defendant
testified that he and his wife had been arguing about his work schedule and that argument
prompted the defendant to remember the alleged physiological and physical abuse his wife
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have sufficient time to premeditate the crime.326 The court held, "[w]hether the
intention to kill and the killing, that is, the premeditation and the fatal act, were
within a brief space of time or a long space of time is immaterial if the killing was
in fact intentional, willful, deliberate, and premeditated." '327 On one level, this
decision may be taken at face value that "time is irrelevant to the issue of
premeditation."
328
Under the Carroll approach, there are two ways to interpret premeditation 329
Under the first interpretation, premeditation is the intention to kill and the state
"need only prove that the defendant killed intentionally" for a first-degree murder
conviction.3 Under the second interpretation, however, "premeditation is still not
the same thing as intent to kill."'33' "Premeditation requires an element of coolness,
of calm reflection. This can happen in an instant, but it is not necessarily present
just because the defendant intended to kill. 332  Some courts follow this
interpretation, "often stressing the 'deliberation' in the 'willful, premeditated, and
deliberate' formula." 331 Courts will refuse to fmd premeditation under this
interpretation if the defendant lacks the capacity to premeditate because of
emotional disturbance, rage, intoxication and fear.
33 4
One commentator points out that there are inherent problems, however, with
both interpretations of the Carroll rule.33' If premeditation simply means intent to
had committed against him and the couple's children. Id. at 913-14.
326 See id. at 916. The defendant relied on the rule enunciated in Commonwealth v.
Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868), that "no time is too short for a wicked man to frame in his mind the
scheme of murder." Id. Carroll argued that a long time is necessary for a man of good
reputation, like himself, to premeditate. See id.
327 Id. at 916 (quoting Commonwealth v. Earnest, 21 A.2d 38, 40 (Pa. 1941)).
328 Pauley, supra note 40, at 151-52. Pauley illustrates that this is a very common
interpretation found in many states. See, e.g., State v. Schrader, 302 S.E.2d 70 (W.Va. 1982);
Young v. State 428 So.2d 155 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); and Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117
(Colo. 1961).
329 Pauley, supra note 40 at 152.
330 Id. West Virginia adopts this interpretation, "[W]hat is really meant by the language
'wilful [sic], deliberate, and premeditated'.. is that the killing be intentional." Schrader,
302 S.E.2d at 75. Other courts, however, "have rejected this equation of premeditation with
intent to kill" Id.. See, e.g., WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW at 257 ("Although an intent to kill,
without more, may support a prosecution for common law murder, such a murder ordinarily
constitutes murder in the first degree only if the intent to kill is accompanied by
premeditation and deliberation.").
331 Pauley, supra note 40 at 153.
332 Id.
333 Id. (citing People v. Caruso, 159 N.E. 390, 392 (N.Y. 1927) where the defendant's
first degree murder conviction was overturned because, "although he had ample time to
premeditate and deliberate, he did not have the capacity to premeditate-in other words, to
reflect calmly on his intended act.").





kill, then there is no reason for a legislature to include modifiers such as
premeditated, deliberate or willful for first-degree murder. The second
interpretation is even more difficult- is it possible for calm reflection and
deliberation to be achieved in a moment? Pauley argues that while a moment is
long enough to form intent to kill, it is not long enough to calmly and deliberately
weigh the alternatives.336 Justice Cardozo seems to agree, stating "an intent to kill
is always deliberate and premeditated within the meaning of the law unless the
mind is so blinded by pain or rage as to make the act little more than an automatic
or spontaneous reaction." '337
The California Supreme Court took a different approach than Pennsylvania by
rejecting outright the notion that premeditation was simply intent to kill.338 The
court held that "in order for a killing with malice aforethought to be first rather than
second degree murder, '[t]he intent to kill must be.. .formed upon a pre-existing
reflection' [and have] been the subject of actual deliberation or forethought. .. ""'
Therefore, first degree premeditated murder only exists if the state proves that the
killing was the "result of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as a
deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and steadily, [especially] according
to a preconceived design."34 The California approach has been both adopted and
criticized because of its limiting nature.34
336 See id.
337 CARDOZO, supra note 323, at 98-99.
338 See People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 948 (Cal. 1968). In that case, the defendant's
first degree murder conviction was overturned because the evidence did not support the
verdict. The victim, a ten year old girl, was stabbed over sixty times. The defendant had
been living for several months with the girl's mother and the mother's two children. There
was evidence that the defendant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the murder, that he
tried to hide the body and clean up after the crime and that he lied to both the mother and
brother of the victim to conceal his act. Id. at 944-46, 948.
339 Id. at 948 (quoting People v. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (Cal. 1945)).
340 Id. at 447 P.2d at 948 (italics in original) (quoting People v. Bender, 163 P.2d 8, 19
(Cal. 1945). The Anderson decision goes on to describe three types of evidence that can be
used to prove premeditation and deliberation:
(1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that
the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to
result in, the killing-what may be described as 'planning' activity; (2) facts about the
defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could
reasonably infer a 'motive' to kill the victim. . .; [and] (3) facts about the nature of the
killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 'preconceived
design' to take his victim's life in a particular way....
Id. at 949 (italics in original). The California Supreme Court noted that in cases that lacked
evidence in all three circumstances, the courts should demand "at least extremely strong
evidence of(l) or evidence of(2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3)." Id.
341 See Pauley, supra note 40, at 158. Examples of other states that take the same view as
Anderson are New Mexico and Michigan. Several New Mexico decisions have "looked to
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The Massachusetts rule on premeditation is similar to the Pennsylvania rule in
that there is no specific requirement for the length of time deliberation must
occur.342 As early as 1905, the SJC recognized that deliberate premeditation may
occur in a matter of seconds.343 Still, just as in Pennsylvania, it is difficult to
ascertain the precise definition of "deliberate premeditation". Is it simply intent to
kill, or is there more to premeditation? Since the SJC has seemingly merged the
terms "deliberately premeditated" and "malice aforethought" into one term of art,
the answer is apparently intent to kill. This raises the question of why the
Legislature included the deliberate premeditation requirement in the murder statute.
Regardless, questions of interpretation almost certainly will arise in the future. The
court could choose to take a new approach as it has done with malice, and adopt a
California style test. Rather than trying to define premeditation properly in new
legislation, it may be useful to ascertain the term's utility in determining the degree
or severity of murder.
2. Premeditation as a Poor Indicator Of Severity
Even if it was possible to adopt a clear and practical definition of premeditation,
there may be better methods for determining which killings are worthy of society's
most severe penalties. "Premeditated" killings are not necessarily the worst crimes,
in fact, many unpremeditated killings shock society's conscience more than
premeditated murders.
evidence of motive, plan, method of killing, and sufficient time to engage in careful thought
and weighing of considerations." Id. See also Romero, supra note 151, at 84. One
Michigan case states that the "interval between initial thought and ultimate action should be
long enough to afford a reasonable man time to subject the nature of his response to a
'second look."' Id. (citing People v. Morrin, 187 N.W2d 434, 449 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)).
The main criticism of the Anderson standard is that it is an extremely difficult standard for
the prosecutor to meet, even in cases that would traditionally be viewed as "first degree"
murder. See Pauley, supra note 40, at 160. The California court seems to accept this
position, and has softened the Anderson standard to some extent. In People v. Perez, 831
P.2d 1159 (Cal. 1992), the court upheld a first degree murder conviction and found that
"[t]he Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to
finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive." Perez, 831 P.2d at I 163.
342 See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 689 N.E.2d 804, 806-08 (Mass. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Jiles, 698 N.E.2d 10, 14-15 (Mass. 1998); Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 581 N.E.2d 999, 1006-
07 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Caine, 318 N.E.2d 901, 907-908 (Mass. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 32 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1941).
343 See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N.E. 127 (Mass. 1905).
In substance the view expressed is that while it must be shown that a plan to murder was
formed after the matter had been made a subject of deliberation and reflection, yet in view of
the quickness with which the mind may act, the law cannot set any limit to the time. It may
be a matter of days, hours, or even seconds. It is not so much a matter of time as of logical
sequence. First the deliberation and premeditation, then the resolution to kill, and lastly the




The inclusion of premeditation in first-degree murder statutes indicates that a
person who plans ahead is worse than is the person who kills on sudden impulse.
Several types of murder contradict this assumption. One form of premeditated
killing, mercy killing, society may not view as particularly "blameworthy."3" On
the other hand, in History of the Criminal Law of England, Judge Stephen pointed
out that some of the most atrocious murders could be unplanned:
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at least
as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden as by
premeditated murder ... [Imagine a man], passing along the road, sees a boy sitting
on a bridge over a deep river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, pushes him into it
and drowns him. A man makes advances to a girl who repels him. He deliberately
but instantly cuts her throat ... In none of these cases is there premeditation unless
the word is used in a sense as unnatural as "aforethought" in "malice aforethought,"
but each represents even more diabolical cruelty and ferocity than that which is
involved in murders premeditated in the natural sense of the word.345
Such problems led to calls for abandonment of the premeditation requirement
and for the adoption of different methods of assessing the severity of homicides. 46
Justice Cardozo called the premeditation formula "defective and unreal
psychology." '347 As a result, some jurisdictions have refused to adopt the distinction
between deliberation and premeditation.348 Commentators from California,349 and
New Mexico35° argued against the incorporation of premeditation in any new
murder statute. Likewise, the Model Penal Code rejects the use of degree structure
based on deliberation or premeditation standards. 1
A more effective method of grading murders may entail listing within the statute
the circumstances, in addition to malice, which would justify to the most severe
344 See Hobson, supra note 281, at 521 (citing State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C.
1987) in which the defendant murdered his terminally ill father because he could not bear to
see his father suffer any longer. The defendant shot his father four times.). The North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction for first-degree murder because
the facts of the case clearly indicated that the killing was premeditated. See Forrest, 362
S.E.2d at 258.
345 3 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883).
346 See Pauley, supra note 40, at 166-69.
347 See CARDOzO, supra note 324, at 100.
348 England has consistently refused to include premeditation in its law of murder. See
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 182-189 (1949-1953). Several
American jurisdictions also have rejected the premeditation formula. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54b (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (1979 & Supp. 1986);
38 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 91 (West 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (West 1982).
349 See Hobson, supra note 282, at 520-21, "Even if premeditation were readily definable,
it is not he best way to distinguish between first- and second- degree murder. Length of
deliberation is not a consistent indicator of moral blame."
350 See Romero, supra note 15 1, at 92.
351 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 Part 11 (1980).
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penalty.352 Professor Romero suggests including murders for pay, murders by
prisoners, murders committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or for the purpose
of facilitating a prisoners escape from lawful custody, and perhaps murders that
occur during the commission of rape or robbery.353 Under this scheme, the
legislative process would replace interpretation of malleable phrases such as
"deliberate premeditation" and determine which instances of murder warrant the
most severe punishment.
IV TOWARDS A NEW MURDER STATUTE FOR MASSACHUSETTS
"But to get [the dragon] out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or
to tame him and make him a useful animal. """
Given the length of time since the enactment of the Massachusetts murder
statute, and the number of differing interpretations by the courts of that original
statute, the time has come to either clarify or redraft the murder statute. The
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association suggested that Massachusetts define
the common law terms within the murder statute. Nevertheless, this measure may
not be enough to fully address the statute's problems. If the Legislature is to
undertake its first re-write of the murder statute in nearly 150 years, the redraft
should be comprehensive. Any reform of this statute should occur with the
intention of: 1) making the terms and elements of murder clear to both practitioners
and the public alike; 2) clearly delineating between murder and manslaughter; and
3) prioritizing the severity of various types of murder and assigning the appropriate
penalty to these different grades.
During the 1999-2000 session of the Massachusetts General Court, the
Massachusetts District Attorneys Association sponsored a bill that addressed some
of the recent changes to the definition of malice imposed by the SJC. The bill,
House Bill 3430 "An Act Further Defining The Crime Of Murder" (H. 3430),
proposed a new section to General Laws chapter 265 § 1 that defined three
important terms: "malice aforethought," '355 "deliberately premeditated" '356 and
352 See Romero, supra note 151, at 93-94 (quoting G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW, 2563 n.23 (1978), .... so far as the classification of murder into degrees was designed
to isolate cases in which the death penalty was justified, that goal appears to be better served
by listing the aggravating circumstances and mitigating considerations that bear on the
gravity of a proven murder").
353 See Romero, supra note 150, at 93-4.
354 Holmes, supra note 5, at 469.
355 See id.
Malice aforethought' may be inferred from evidence that the defendant
without legal justification or excuse (1) acted with intent to kill another,
or (2) acted with intent to do grievous bodily harm to another, or (3) acted
in a manner such that a reasonably prudent person, with the defendant's
knowledge of the circumstances of the intended act, would have realized
that the intended act created a plain and strong likelihood of death or grievous
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"extreme atrocity or cruelty." ' At the Criminal Justice Committee hearing on H.
3430, Plymouth Assistant District Attorney Geline Williams pointed out the
difficulties faced by both prosecutors and the judiciary in properly and clearly
defining the various elements of murder.35 By defining the common law terms the
Legislature could put the uncertainty of this law to rest, stop the shifting standards
adopted by the SJC, and restore some recently changed aspects of the law of
murder. According to Ms. Williams, H. 3430 was meant to "open a discussion" on
how the legislature should revise the murder statute." 9
A good opposing argument is that instead of simply redefining the common law
terms, the Legislature should undertake the task of fully redrafting the murder
statute. This process could produce a clearer, more precise statute, but also will
produce a long overdue reexamination of what is more culpable criminal behavior
and determine how to punish that behavior. Instead of re-codifying the common
law, as was done in the 1850's, or returning the murder statute to its meaning of
twenty, fifty or a hundred years ago, the legislative process could be the vehicle by
which important policy decisions are made so that the new statute represents the
public's attitudes and desires regarding how to punish various forms of homicide.
By properly redrafting the homicide statutes, the Legislature can also end the
shifting standards adopted by the court in recent years. Finally, the Legislature can
set out proportionate and appropriate penalties for homicide. Without question, a
clear, well-defined murder statute will be of great benefit to trial judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys and the jurors who must decide these homicide
bodily harm to another, or (4) knowingly used deadly force with intent to do
bodily harm to another, or (5) acted with conscious disregard of the risk to the life
of another during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, or




An act is 'deliberately premeditated' if the person who commits the act (1) either did
consider or did consciously disregard that the intended act would create a plain and
strong likelihood of death or grievous bodily harm to another, and (2) did decide to
commit the intended act, and (3) did commit the act in furtherance of that decision.
Id.
See id.
Murder is committed 'with extreme atrocity or cruelty' if the jury may conclude from
the evidence that the death was caused in a manner which reflected cruelty on the part of
the defendant which greatly surpassed that inherent in any unjustified or unlawful taking
of life, or the jury concludes, the circumstances known to the defendant, the unjustified
or unlawful taking of life was exceedingly shocking, brutal, appalling, horrifying, or
revolting.
Id.
358 Criminal Justice Committee Hearing, June 8, 1999.
359 See id.
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cases.
1. Goals and Priorities
If the Legislature takes up the challenge of rewriting the murder statute, what
should the new statute look like? Below are several objectives for which the
Legislature should strive.
a. Eliminate common law terms.
This is perhaps the most important goal in that it will have the greatest reform
effect. As discussed above, the reason Bentham urged that government codify
criminal statutes were not only to make them clear, but also to keep the important
power of deciding what was and was not criminal behavior in the hands of elected
officials, instead of in the hands of an appointed and removed judiciary.360 When
Massachusetts enacted the current murder statute with the common law terms and
ideas intact, the judiciary continued to have power over defining the essential terms
of the statute. While this was not a problem for the 150 years that the definition of
"malice" remained the same as it had been in the time of Blackstone, the Court's
recent pronouncements have made the law of murder at the very least difficult to
understand and at worst impossible to predict. Furthermore, there is no assurance
that the Court's definitions of "malice," "premeditation," "felony-murder," and
"extreme atrocity or cruelty" will not continue to change. A well-drafted statute
that does not rely on the common law terms and properly defines the terms it does
employ will go a long way toward making the statute clear and stable.
b. Eliminate premeditation as a requirement for first degree murder.
The original proposal for premeditation as a requirement for first-degree murder
attempted to separate the more heinous crimes from those that were spur of the
moment, and therefore less culpable. The time has come to abandon this inadequate
dividing line. First, premeditation has become little more than a legal fiction
because a killing may be "premeditated" in less than a moment. In fact, the only
real influence "premeditation" has had is that as an element of first-degree murder,
the SJC used it to limit the definition of first-degree malice to intent to kill
standard. Second, since 1858 it has become clear that certain premeditated killings
may be deemed "understandable" by the general public, and deserve a lesser
sentence, whereas other killings committed without premeditation are among the
most loathsome of crimes. A woman who kills her terminally ill and suffering
husband as an act of mercy committed first-degree murder and must serve life in
prison without the possibility of parole because it is clearly a premeditated killing.
In stark contrast, and according to recent SJC decisions, a man who beats a baby
until it bleeds to death may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter and may
360 See Kadish, supra note 51, at 1099-06.
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serve less than four years in prison.36 A new dividing line should be drawn to
accurately reflect the public attitudes toward different types of killings.
c. Eliminate the degrees of murder.
Most states define murder by statute, and have, like the federal statute, divided
the crime into two degrees. Murders perpetrated by means of poison, by lying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or those
killings committed during the perpetration of an arson, rape, robbery or burglary,
are commonly deemed "murder of the first degree." '362 These states have deemed
any other form of murder to be less serious, and therefore "murder of the second-
degree," which is punished less severely.363 In Massachusetts, the difference in
penalty between first and second-degree murder is great; those convicted of
second- degree murder are eligible for parole after serving fifteen years of a life
sentence while those convicted of first-degree murder have no chance at parole. As
discussed above, degrees of murder were introduced to allow some killers, whose
killings were less reprehensible or more sympathetic, to escape the death penalty.3"
Furthermore, in Massachusetts, the jury was specifically empowered to determine
the degree of murder, so that the penalty would better reflect the will of the public
at large.365 Given the archaic and confusing state of the law of murder, the sentence
can rarely be said to reflect the public will.
A strong argument may be made that degrees are not necessary at all. The
English criminal justice system demonstrates that it is possible to separate capital
murders from non-capital murders, or to categorize some murders as deserving of a
heightened penalty without dividing the crime into degrees. The English Homicide
Act of 1957 stated that murders committed in certain ways are punishable by death
and that all other murder is subject to life imprisonment.3" Similarly, the Model
Penal Code also dispenses with the degree structure, and does not distinguish
between purposeful, knowing, or reckless homicides.367 This decision was based
on a theory that purposeful knowledge and recklessness have a common theme of
indifference to human life.36 Some commentators have argued that the Code's
dispensation of degrees is poor policy because the original need for degrees;
distinguishing capital from non-capital crimes, is still very much a necessity.369
However, because the death penalty currently is not an issue in Massachusetts,37 ° a
361 See Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677.
362 See MODEL PENAL CODE §210.2 cmt. 16.
363 id.
3(4 See id.
165 See, e.g., Address of His Excellency George N. Briggs to the Two Branches of the
Legislature of Massachusetts (Mass. 1846).
366 See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 40, at 642.
367 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.2 cmt. 3.
368 See id. at §210.2 cmt. 4.
369 Hobson, supra note 281, at 527.
370 The reinstatement of the death penalty was rejected by the Legislature in each of the
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capital murder provision is unnecessary.
Perhaps a better method of punishing any homicide is to have a range of years
available to the judge or jury to assign according to enumerated aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The current trend in Massachusetts, however, has been
to give less latitude to the sentencing judge through the use of mandatory minimum
sentences. For this reason, giving the judge more flexibility may not be politically
feasible. Nevertheless, it should be explored as an option.
d. Allow for proportionality of punishment according to the relative
blameworthiness of the killing.
Closely related to the degrees of murder is how to punish killings that have
different levels of culpability and severity. Perhaps the time has come to take the
power of determining the degree of the crime away from the jury. By setting out
clear punishments for the most serious forms of murder, such as murder for
financial gain, the Legislature can be sure that what the public perceives as the
most reprehensible crimes will always receive the most severe penalty. For all
other forms of murder, the Legislature could establish a penalty range and empower
the trial judge to sentence according to the particular facts of the case. Not only is
this one of the traditional roles of the judge, the trial judge would be in a better
position to punish proportionally to other murders. Address the amount of burden
this system would have on the Court This flexibility will allow the judge to treat
behavior that is murder, but may have some mitigating circumstances such as the
battered wife who kills her abusive husband or the spouse who kills her suffering
husband, differently from other murders. The new statute could specify that the
trial judge must give a rationale for his sentencing decision, which lists the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that influenced his decision. Such an
explanation, which may be impossible to solicit from a jury, would be useful in the
public's understanding of why a particular punishment for certain behavior was
warranted. Finally, by providing sentences based upon aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, it may be possible to dispense with voluntary manslaughter as a
separate crime. The sentencing judge could consider the mitigating factors that
make an intentional killing manslaughter and not murder and an appropriate
sentence could be imposed. By introducing greater judicial discretion-with clear
guidelines-the Legislature could introduce a better sense of proportionality
between criminal culpability and punishment.
e. The Legislature should retain felony-murder and specifically list those
felonies that will be considered inherently dangerous.
Although commentators argued against retaining the theory of felony
last several sessions. Still, in the 1998 session, reinstatement was defeated by only one vote
in the House of Representatives. The death penalty, therefore, may again become an issue
within the murder debate.
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murder 37' there are several reasons why it should be retained. Not only is felony-
murder politically popular, it adds an element of proportionality.372 In addition, the
felony murder rule remains politically popular despite academic criticism because
"[it] is just the sort of simple, commonsense, readily enforceable, and widely
known principle that is likely to result in deterrence. 373  Some commentators
consider a heightened penalty for a felony that ended in death a suitable
replacement for felony-murder. 4 In such cases the killer might receive the same
prison time but escape public scorn because he is not labeled a "murderer." The
removal of felony-murder from the statute thus minimizes the victim's death in that
the commission of a crime that results in death may be equated with the
commission of a similar crime that lacks death. 3 In addition, the commission of a
felony is the most dangerous form of recklessness. If someone undertakes a major
felony, he should and must assume the risks that accompany that dangerous and
illegal activity.
However, felony-murder should be limited. The changing nature of both the
term "felony" and the sentences assigned to felonies, suggests that a plain meaning
reading of the current statute is not appropriate. The limitations, however, should
be easily understood and the statute should enumerate specific "inherently
dangerous" felonies, which if the commission of the felony results in death, will
qualify the defendant for a mandatory life sentence. This provision will both limit
judicial redefinition and allow the Legislature to clearly state which felonies are so
dangerous that a resulting homicide will expose the defendant to a mandatory life
sentence.
2. Proposed Language
Given the five goals above, a possible murder statute may take the following
form:
M.G.L. c. 265 §1 Murder.
A. Definitions.
"Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty," includes, but is not limited to, indifference
to or taking pleasure in the victim's suffering, consciousness and degree of
371 See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 108, at44 ("the reason for the rule has ceased to exist");
LaFave &Scott, supra note 40, at 560-61 (1972) ("[it] is arguable that there should be no
such separate category of murder").
372 See Crump, supra note 279, at 363 ("Felony murder reflects a societal judgment than
an intentionally committed robbery that causes the death of a human being is qualitatively
more serious than an identical robbery that does not.")
373 id.
374 See, e.g., Dickey, supra note 275 at 1366-70 (discussing the recent history of the
felony-murder rule within the Wisconsin murder statute).
375 See Crump, supra note 279, at 367-69.
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suffering of the victim, extent of physical injuries to the victim, number of
blows inflicted on the victim, manner and force with which the blows were
delivered, the instrument employed, and disproportion between the means
needed to cause death and those employed.
"Torture" means the intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged
physical pain for the purposes of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any
other purpose.
Comment: In addition to exercising the proposed statute of common law terms,
the first paragraph should define legal terms that require clarification.
B. Murder is the killing of one human being by another without lawful
justification or excuse, and unless the defendant acts upon sufficient
provocation upon a sudden quarrel, or in the heat of passion, by any of the
following means:
(1) the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim;
(2) the defendant specifically intended to cause the victim grievous bodily
harm;
(3) in the commission of or attempt to commit a felony that is inherently
dangerous to human life or is committed in a dangerous manner;
(4) the defendant recklessly creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of
death or great bodily injury under circumstances indicating extreme
indifference to the value of human life.
Comment: This statute defines murder without using the phrase "malice
aforethought," yet the scope of murder includes the traditional, wide range of
killings that the public considers "murder." Specifically, this includes restoring the
reckless creation of risk of grievous bodily injury to the definition of murder.
Additionally, the statute retains felony murder but in a limited fashion. The
limitation differs from the current Massachusetts rule that states that the crime be
either inherently dangerous or be committed with a conscious disregard for the risk
to human life. The proposed felony murder rule retains the first limitation, but
changes the second limitation to a standard that can be clearly established by the
objective facts of a crime, rather than creating a second recklessness standard that
may differ from clause (4).
C. Any murder that is committed:
(1) for the purpose of financial gain;
(2) for the purpose of obstructing the judicial system;
(3) by the use of explosives;
(4) by torture;








shall be punished by imprisonment in state prison for a term of life. No
person shall be eligible for parole under section 133A of chapter 127 while he
or she is serving a life sentence for murder, but if his or her sentence is
commuted there from by the governor and council under the provisions of
section 152 of said chapter 127 he or she shall thereafter be subject to the
provisions of law governing parole for persons sentenced for lesser offenses.
Comment: This provision reserves the most severe penalty currently available
under Massachusetts law-life in prison without the possibility of parole for those
murders that many people consider particularly heinous for. The proposed section
accomplishes this without broadly stating that intentional or premeditated murders
are automatically the most serious murders. This penalty is a form of a "mandatory
minimum" penalty, which has become a popular sentencing tool in recent years. 76
The minimum sentence will assure that those murders that the public considers
particularly wicked or blameworthy, including the most serious instances of felony
murder, are punished proportionally. This is essentially "first degree murder," but
is purposely not referred to as such because the maximum penalty is not exclusive
to these circumstances. In fact, a sentence of life imprisonment will be available to
the sentencing judge in every homicide where if she finds the presence of
aggravating circumstances which warrant such a serious sentence. This possibility
is discussed below.
D. 1) All other murders shall be punished by imprisonment in state prison
for a term of not less than 20 years and not more than life. A sentence of life
shall not be reduced to less than 20 years nor shall the person be eligible for
probation, parole, furlough, work release or receive any deduction from his
sentence for good conduct until having served 20 years.
Comment: This provision makes all murder not covered in paragraph C subject
to a range of punishment from 20 years to life imprisonment. A new murder statute
should recognize that murder can take many forms, both in the method by which it
is accomplished, the circumstances which surround the killing, and the mental state
or motive of the killer. For example, the traditional forms of extreme atrocity or
cruelty, with the exception of torture, are now aggravating circumstances to be
balanced against any mitigating circumstances, such as mental condition.
Accordingly, this provision gives the sentencing judge some flexibility when
deciding the proper penalty. The opportunity exists, however, for the imposition of
a life sentence in deserving cases not covered in paragraph C. Such sentencing
flexibility is essential to create a sense of proportionality and fairness because of
the complicated nature of so many homicides. This structure allows proportional
sentencing without relying on artificial and inflexible factors such as premeditation.
2) The sentencing judge shall state the reasons, including any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, for the sentence imposed. The sentencing judge
shall not be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing in determining
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
376 For example, the Massachusetts Legislature has imposed mandatory minimum
sentences in regards to trafficking narcotics. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32E.
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a) Aggravating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to:
i) The victim's vulnerability due to age or physical or mental disability;
ii) The murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty;
iii) The defendant was a leader in the commission of an offense involving
two or more criminal actors;
iv) The defendant committed the offense while on probation, on parole, or
during escape; or
v) The defendant has committed repeated offenses against the same victim.
b) Mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to:
i) the defendant was a minor participant in the criminal conduct;
ii) the defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced the culpability of the defendant for the offense;
iii) the sentence was imposed in accordance with a jointly agreed
recommendation;
iv) the age of the defendant at the time of the offense; or
v) the victim provoked the defendant, but the provocation does not amount
to a defense to murder.
Comment: These aggravating and mitigating circumstances derive largely from
the proposed Massachusetts Sentencing Guidelines.377 These are not exclusive lists
as the sentencing judge has flexibility to adequately fit the facts of the murder into
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The provocation-mitigating factor may
cover situations where the "provocation" occurs over several years, such as the case
of an abused spouse. Whereas the provocation does not excuse the crime, or even
lessen it to manslaughter, the sentencing judge may give a lesser sentence in light
of those facts.
V. Conclusion
The dragon is old. Born of an ancient tradition, it was given a territory to roam,
but was subsequently ignored by the Legislature. Recently hobbled by the courts,
the dragon is now a gnarled, obscure and unpredictable creature. The time has
come to slay this dragon and put a new one in its place to punish society's gravest
crime.
The Massachusetts murder statute is complicated, tied to archaic language, and
constantly changing in meaning and standards. As discussed above, the definition
of malice, the line between murder and manslaughter, and what constitutes felony-
murder have all undergone significant changes. These shifts have come at the
hands of a SJC that systematically limited the reach of the murder statute through a
series of decisions within the last twenty years. Although one could argue that the
activism created this situation, it is the Legislature's inactivity over the last 150
years that gave the Court a free hand to redefine murder as they saw fit. In
377 See REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SENTENCING COMMISSION at 19 (1996).
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addition, the Legislature, by enacting a statute that relies on common law terms
such as "malice," allowed the court to reinterpret and redefine murder. The statute
also continues to employ the arbitrary and outmoded concept of premeditation to
define the most serious forms of murder. The shifting nature of murder has made
the statute nearly impossible for even judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys to
understand. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statute is unpredictable in
that the statute will almost certainly continue to "evolve" with every decision
handed down by the SJC. Until the statute is stable and predictable problems will
continue to plague judges when instructing juries, prosecutors when seeking
indictments and all litigators when preparing for murder trials.
The Legislature must reform the murder statute so that it will not only be
understandable, but will also punish killers according to their relative
blameworthiness and the threat they pose to society. The proposed statute above
represents a vast improvement over the current statute. This language eliminates
the term "malice," it does away with the concept of premeditation, clearly states
what criminal conduct will expose a person to a felony murder charge, and
mandates the most severe penalty for the most blameworthy homicides. Not only
will the proposed language be more easily understood by practitioners and jurors, it
will be not be as open to judicial reinterpretation as the current statute.
The Legislature cannot ignore this dragon any longer. It must fulfill its
obligation to clearly and concisely set forth what does and what does not constitute
murder in the state of Massachusetts and how murderers will be punished.
2001]
